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UNITED STATES v. ISAAC N. COOKE.
Where a statute defining an offence contains an exception in the mnacting
clause, which is so incorporated with the language defining the offence, that the
ingredients of the offence cannot be fully set out without negativing the exception,
an indictment must allege enough to show that the accused is not within the
exception.
But if the exception is separable from the language of the enacting clause, and
the offence can be fully and accurately defined without reference to it, the indictment is good without such reference.
An indictment charged the accused with the commission, more than two years
previously, of certain acts amounting to an offence as defined by an Act of Congress ; another act limited prosecutions for this and other offences to two years,
unless the accused had been a fugitive from justice. On demurrer the indictment
was held good, though it did not allege that the accused was within the exception.

ON a certificate of division in opinion between the Judges of the
Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of
Ohio.
C. .H. fill, Assistant Attorney-General, for the United States.
Kebler and Whitman, for the defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CLIrFOrD, J.-Officers and other persons charged with the
safe-keeping, transfer and disbursement of the public moneys, are
required by an Act of Congress to keep an accurate entry of each
sum received, and of each payment or transfer; and the 16th
section of the same act provides that if any one of the said officers
siall convert to his own use, in any way whatever, any portion of
the public moneys intrusted to him for safe-keeping, dislursement
or transfer, or for any other purpose, every such act shall be
deemed and adjudged to be embezzlement of so much of the public
moneys as shall be thus taken and converted, which is therein
declared to be a felony ; and the same section also provides that
all persons advising or participating in such act, being convicted
thereof before any court of the United States of competent jurisdiction, shall be punished as therein provided : 9 Stat. at Large 63.
Founded on that provision, the indictment in this case contained
six counts, charging that the defendant, as paymaster in the army,
had in his custody for safe-keeping and disbursement, a large sum
of public money intrusted to him in his official character as an
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additional paymaster in the army, and that he, on the respective
days therein alleged, did unlawfully, knowingly and feloniously
embezzle and convert the same to his own use. Such conversion
is alleged in the first count, on the 1st of May 1862, in the second
on the 6th of July, in the third on the 16th of October, in the
fourth on the 12th of September, in the fifth on the 20th of September, and in the sixth on the 15th of November, all in the same
year. Service was made, and the defendant appeared and demurred to the first five counts, showing for cause, that it appears
on the face of the indictment, and by the allegations of the said
several counts, that the crime charged against him was committed
more than two years before the indictment was found, and filed in
court.
Three questions were presented by the demurrer for the decision
of the court, upon which the opinions of the judges were opposed,
in substance and effect as follows: (1) Whether it was competent
for the defendant to take exception, by demurrer, to the sufficiency
of the first five counts of the indictment for the causes assigned.
(2) Whether the said five counts, or either of them, allege or
charge, upon their face, any crime or offence against the defendant
for which he is liable in law to be put upon trial, convicted and
punished. Both of those questions are presented in the record as
one, but inasmuch as the answers to them must be different, it is
more convenient to divide the question into two parts. (3) Whether
the 32a section of the Crimes Act applies to the case, and limits
the time within which an indictment must be found for such an
offence: 1 Stat. at Large 119.
Forgery of public securities was made'a capital felony by that
act, as well as treason, piracy and murder, and the 32d section of
the act provides that no person shall be prosecuted, tried or punished for treason or other capital felony, wilful murder or forgery
excepted, unless the indictment for the same shall be found by the
grand jury within three years next after the treason or capital
offence shall be done or committed: 1 Stat. at Large 119.
Provision is also made by the succeeding clause of the same
section, that no person shall be prosecuted, tried or punished for
.lny offence, not capital, unless the indictment for the same shall
be found within two years from the time of committing the offence.
Fines and penalties, under any penal statute, were also included
in the same limitation, but that part of the clause having been
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superseded by a subsequent enactment, it is omitted: 5 Stat. at
Large 322; Stimpson v. Pond, 2 Curt. 502.
Appended to the 32d section, enacting the limitation under consideration, is the following proviso: Provided, that nothing herein
contained shall extend to any person or persons fleeing from
justice: 1 Stat. at Large 119.
Where a statute defining an offence contaifis an exception, in the
enacting clause of the statute, which is so incorporated with the
language defining the offence, that the ingredients of the offence cannot be accurately and clearly described if the exception is omitted,
the rules of good pleading require that an indictment founded upon
the statute must allege enough to show that the accused is not within
the exception, but if the language of the section defining the offence
is so entirely separable from the exception, that the ingredients constituting the offence may be accurately and clearly defined without
any reference to the exception, the pleader may safely omit any
such reference, as the matter contained in the exception is matter
of defence and must be shown by the accused: Steel v. Smith, 1
Barn. & Ald. 99; Arch. Crim. Plead., 15th ed., 54. Offences created by statute, as well as offences at common law, must be accurately and clearly described in an indictment; and if they cannot
be, in any case, without an allegation that the accused is not
within an exception contained in the statute defining the offence,
it is clear that no indictment founded upon the statute can be a
good one, which does not contain such an allegation, as it is universally true that no indictment is sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege all the ingredients of which the offence is
composed: Rex v. Mason, 2 Term R. 581.
With rare exceptions, offences consist of more than one ingre
dient, and in some cases of many, and the rule is universal that
every ingredient of which the offence is composed must be accurately and clearly alleged in the indictment, or the indictment will
be bad, and may be quashed on motion, or the judgment may be
arrested, or be reversed on error: Arch. Plea. Cr. Cas., 15th ed., 54.
Text writers and courts of justice have sometimes said, that if
the exception is in the enacting clause, the party pleading must
show that -the accused is not within the exception, but where the
exception is in a subsequent section or statute, that the matter contained in the exception is matter of defence, and must be shown
by the accused. Undoubtedly that rule will frequently hold good,
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and in many cases prove to be a safe guide in pleading, but it is
clear that it is not a universal criterion, as the words of the statute
defining the offence may be so entirely separable from the exception, that all the ingredients constituting the offence may be accurately and clearly alleged without any reference to the exception:
Commonwealth v. Hart, 11 Cush. 132.
Cases have also arisen, and others may readily be supposed, where
the exception, though in a subsequent clause or section, or even
in a subsequent statute, is nevertheless clothed in such language,
and is so incorporated as an amendment with the words antecedently employed to define the offence that it would be impossible
to frame the actual statutory charge in the form of an indictment
with accuracy, and the required certainty, without an allegation
showing that the accused was not within the exception contained
in the subsequent clause, section or statute. Obviously such an
exception must be pleaded, as otherwise the indictment would not
present the actual statutory accusation, and would also be defective
for the want of clearness and certainty: State v. Abbey, 29 Vermont 66; 1 Bishop Crim. Proceed., 2d ed., sec. 639, n. 3.
Support to these views is found in many cases where the precise
point was well considered. Much consideration was given to the
subject in the case of Com. v. Hart, 11 Cush. 130, where it is
said that the rule of pleading a statute which contains an exception is the same as that applied in pleading a private instrument
of contract, that if such an instrument contains in it, first, a general clause, and afterwards a separate and distinct clause which has
the effect of taking out of the general clause something that otherwise would be included in it, a party relying upon the general clause
in pleading may set out that clause only, without noticing the
separate and distinct clause which operates as an exception, but
if the exception itself is incorporatedin the general clause, then the
party relying on "the general clause, must in pleading state the
general clause together with the exception," which appears to be
correct, but the reasons assigned for the alternative branch of the
rule are not quite satisfactory, as they appear to overlook the important fact in the supposed case that the exception itself is supposed to be incorporated in the general clause.
Where the exception itself is incorporated in the general clause,
as is supposed in the alternative rule there laid down, then it is
correct to say, whether speaking of a statute or private contract,
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that unless the exception in the general clause is negatived in
pleading the clause, no offence, or no cause of action, will appear
in the indictment or declaration when compared with the statute
or contract, but when the exception or proviso is in a subsequent substantive clause, the case contemplatedin the enacting or general clause
may be fully stated without negativing the exception or proviso, as
a primd facie case is stated, and it is for the party for whom matter
of excuse is furnished by the statute or contract to bring it forward in his defence.
Commentators and judges have sometimes been led into error
by supposing that the words "enacting clause," as frequently employed, mean the section of the statute defining the offence, as
contradistinguished from a subsequent section in the same statute,
which is a misapprehension of the term, as the only real question
in the case is whether the exception is so incorporated with the
substance of the clause defining the offence as to constitute a
material part of the description of the acts, omission or other ingredients which constitute the offence. Such an offence must be
accurately and clearly described, and if the exception is so incorporated with the clause describing the offence that it becomes in
fact a part of the description, then it cannot be omitted in the
pleading, but if it is not so incorporated -with the clause defining
the offence as to become a material part of the definition of the
offence, then it is matter of defence and must be shown by the
other party, though it be in the same section or even in the succeeding sentence: 2 Lead. Grim. Gas., 2d ed. 12; Travasour v.
Ormrod, 9 D. & 11. 599; Spieres v. Parker,1 Term 141; Comrnonwealth v. Bean, 14 Gray 53; 1 Stark. Grim. Plead. 246.
Both branches of the rule are correctly stated in the case of
Steel v. Smith, 1 B. & Ald. 99, which was a suit for a penalty, and
may perhaps be regarded as the leading case upon the subject.
'Separate opinions were given by the judges, but they were unanimous in the conclusion, which is stated as follows by the reporter:
Where an Act of Parliament in the enacting clause creates an
offence and gives a penalty, and in the same section there follows
a proviso containing an exception which is not incorporatedin the
enacting clause by any words of reference, it is not necessary for
the plaintiff in suing for the penalty to negative such proviso in
his declaration.
All of the judges concurred in that view, and B.YLEY, J., re-
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marked that where there is an exception so incorporated with the
enacting clause that the one cannot be read without the other, there
the exception must be negatived.
Doubtless there is a technical distinction between an exception
and a proviso, as an exception ought to be of that which would
otherwise be included in the category from which it is excepted,
and the office of a proviso is either to except something from the
enacting clause or to qualify or restrain its generality, or to exclude some ground of misinterpretation of it, as extending to cases
not intended to be brought within its operation, but there are a
great many examples where the distinction is disregarded and
where the words are used as if they were of the same signification:
Gurly v. Curly, 8 C1. & Fin. 764; Minis v. U'nited States, 15
Pet. 445; Stephen on Plead., 9th Am. ed. 443.
Few better guides upon the general subject can be found than
the one given at a very early period by TREBY, Ch. J., in Jonesv. Azen, 1 Ld. Raym. 120, in which he said, the difference is that
where an exception is incorporated in the body of the clause, he
who pleads the clause ought also to plead the exception, but when
there is a clause for the benefit of the pleader, and afterwards follows a proviso which is against him, he shall plead the clause, and
leave it to the adversary to show the proviso; which is substantially
the same rule in both its branches as that given at a much more
recent period in the case of Steel v. Smith, which received the
unanimous concurrence of the judges of the court by which it was
promulgated.
Apply those rules to the case before the court and all difficulty,
is removed in answering the questions for decision. Neither an
exception nor a proviso of any kind is contained in the Act of
Congress defining the offence, and every ingredient of the offence
therein defined is accurately and clearly described in the indictment. Nothing different is pretended by the defendant, but the
contention is that the demurrer does not admit the force and effect
of these allegations, because another Act of Congress provides that
no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or convicted of the offence
unless the indictment for the same shall be found within two years
from the time of committing the offence.
Argument to show that a demurrer to an indictment admits
every matter of fact which is well pleaded is unnecessary, as the
proposition is not denied, and inasmuch as the offence is well
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alleged in each of the counts to which the demurrer applies, it is
difficult to see upon what ground it can be contended that the defendant may, by demurrer, set up the Statute of Limitations as a
defence, it appearing beyond all doubt that the act defining the
offence contains neither an exception nor a proviso of any kind.
Tested by the principles herein suggested, it is quite clear that
such a theory cannot be supported, but it must be admitted that
decided cases are referred to which not only countenance that
view, but adjudge it to be correct. Some of the cases, however,
admit that the judgment cannot be arrested for such a defect if it
appears that the Statute of Limitations contains any exception,
as the presumption in that state of the case would be that evidence
was introduced at the trial which brought the defendant within
some one of the exceptions: State v. 1obs, 39 Ale. 212 ; People
v. Santvoord, 9 Cow. 660; State v. Bust, 8 Blackf. 195.
Obviously the supposed error, if it be one, could not be corrected by a motion in arrest, for the reason suggested in those
cases, and it is quite as difficult to understand the reason of the
rule which affirms that a demurrer will work any such result, as it
cannot be admitted that a demurrer is a proper pleading where it
will have the effect to shut out evidence properly admissible under
the general issue to rebut the presumption of the supposed defect
it was filed to correct.
Suppose that is so, then it clearly follows that the demurrer
ought not to be sustained in this case, as the Statute of Limitations in question contains an exception, and it may be that the
prosecutor, if the defendant is put to trial under the general issue,
will be able to introduce evidence to show that he, the defendant.
is within that exception. Although the reasons given for that
conclusion appear to be persuasive and convincing, still it is true
tIhat there are decided cases which support the opposite rule, and
which affirm that the prosecutor must so frame the indictment as
to bring the offence within the period specified in the Statute of
Limitations, or the defendant may demur, move in arrest of judginent or bring error: State v. Tyan, 19 La. An. 435; U. S. v.
11Vatkins, 3 Cran. C. 0. 550; People v. Miller, 12 Cal. 294;
A-eLane v. The State, 4 Geo. 340.
Sometimes it is argued that the case of Com. v. Ruffnier, 28
Penn. St. 260, and Ilatwood v. The State, 18 Ind. 492, adopt the
same rule, but it is clear that neither of those cases supports any
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such proposition. Instead of that, they both decide that it is not
necessary to plead the Statute of Limitations in criminal casesthat the defendant may give it in evidence under the general issue,
which undoubtedly is correct, as it affords the prosecutor in opportunity where the statute contains exceptions, to introduce rebutting evidence, and bring the defendant within one of the exceptions.
Accused persons may avail themselves of the Statute of Timitations by special plea or by evidence under the general issue, but
courts of justice, if the statute contains exceptions, will not quash
an indictment because it appears upon its face that it was not
found within the period prescribed in the limitation, as such a proceeding would deprive the prosecutor of the right to reply or give
evidence, as the case may be, that the defendant fled from justice,
and was within the exception: U. S. v. White, 5 Cran. 0. 0. 60;
State v. .Howard, 15 Rich. (S. C.) 282; State v. Hussey, 7 Iowa
409.
Nor is it admitted that any different rule would apply in the
case even if the Statute of Limitations did not contain any exception, as time is not of the essence of the offence; and also for the
reason that the effect of the demurrer, if sustained, would be to
preclude the prosecutor from giving evidence, as he would have a
right to do, under the general issue, to show that the offence was
committed within two years next before the indictment was found
and filed.
Examples are given by commentators which serve to illustrate
the general doctrine even better than some judicial opinions. No
mariner, it was enacted, who was serving on board any privateer
employed in certain British colonies should be liable to be impressed unless it appeared that he had previously deserted from an
English ship of war, and the act provided that any officer who
should impress such a mariner should be liable to a penalty of
fifty dollars. Judgment was arrested in an action brought for the
penalty there imposed, because' the declaration did not allege that
the mariner had not previously deserted, as that circumstance entered into the very description of the offence, and constituted a
part of the transaction made penal by the statute: Spieres v.
_Parker, 1 Term 141.
Labor and travelling on the Lord's day, except from necessity
and charity, are forbidden in some states by statute, which also
VOL. XXI.-45
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furnishes an example where the exception is a constituent part of
the offence, as it is not labor and travelling, merely, which are prohibited, but unnecessary labor and travelling, or labor and travelling not required for charity: State v. Barker, 18 Vermont 195.
Innkeepers are also prohibited by statute, in some jurisdictions,
to entertain on the Lord's day, persons not lodgers in the inn, if
resident in the town where the inn is kept, and an indictment
founded on that statute was held to be bad, because it did not aver
that the persons entertained were not lodgers, as it is clear that
that circumstance was an ingredient of the offence : Commonwealth
v. Tuck, 20 Pick. 361.
So an English statute made it penal for any person, not employed in the public mint, to make or mend any instrument used
for coining, and it was held that the indictment must negative the
want of authority, as that clause was a part of the description of
the offence: 1 East P. 0. 167; 2 Lead. Crim. Cas., 2d ed. 9.
Equally instructive examples are also given by commentators,
to show that nothing of the kind is required where the exception
is not incorporated with the clause defining the offence, nor connected with it in any manner by words of reference, as in such
cases it is not a constituent part of the offence, but is a matter of
defence and must be pleaded or given in evidence by the accused:
1 Bish. Crim. Proced., 2d ed., §§ 405, 632, 635, 639; Steel v.
Smith, 1 B. & Ald. 99; State v. Abbey, 29 Vermont 66: 1 Am.
Crim. Law, 6th ed., §§ 378, 379; 1 Wat. Arch. Crim. Prac., ed.
'(30, 287; Plex v. Pearce, Russ. & Ryan C. C. 174; .5e. v.
]ubinson, Ibid. 321 ; Rex v. Baxter, 2 East P. C. 781; s. c., 2
Leach C. C., 4th ed. 578; 1 Gabbet Crim. Law 283.
Sufficient has already been remarked to show what ansioci must
be given to the first and second questions, which are both contained
in, the first interrogatory in the record, and it is only nece;ary to
add in respect to the third, which is numbered second in the
itrscript, that the only Statute of Limitations applicable to the
offence alleged in the indictment, is the one enacted in the thirtvsccond section of the original Crimes Act, which cannot, however,
avail the defendant under the demurrer filed to the indictment.
Let the following answers be certified to the Circuit Court:
(1) That it is not competent for the defcnbm/n to tak, e'Copzzion
uy demurrer to the first five counts of thwe in(lictmc t. for the
cause assigned. (2) That the said five counts and each of them,
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do allege and charge upon their face a crime or offence against the
defendant, for which-he is liable in law, to be put upon trial, convicted and punished. (3) That the thirty-second section of tne
Crimes Act enacts the only Statute of Limitation, applicable to the
offence charged against the defendant, but that he cannot avail
iimsclf of it under the demurrer filed to the indictment.
The second of the three points held by
the court in the above case being very
thoroughly treated in the notes to Comnonwealth v. Hart, 1 Lead. Crim. Cas.
250, and the third point being one not
calling for discussion, it is proposed to
collect and comment upon the authorities relevant to the first point.
To
state the principles which rule the question before us more clearly and briefly
than has been done by the learned judge
who delivered the opinion of the court
would scarcely be possible, but to an understanding of the cases it is necessary
to consider the elementary laws of
pleading, which govern the matter of
the statement for instance, in an indictment, of the time of an offence committed, and what special rules apply to
the Statute of Limitations in this connection.
We have then first this doctrine,
namely: That the time laid in an indictment should be before action brought.
And this, in general, is the sole requirement: Lee v. Clark, 2 East 233 ; Gil.
Ev. 265 ; East P. C., c. it 60, p. 124,
with cases cited ; 2 Co. Inst. 318 ; Syers's
Case, 3 Mod. 230. In one case further
particularity is demanded, thatviz. where
time is of the essence of the crime, e. g.
night in the case of burglary, &c.,
vide the example given post 695. That
the time of an embezzlement is not, unless made so by the Statute of Limitations, of the essence of the offence, will
not be argued; this exception, therefore, may for the present be ignored.
Up to this point it is clear that we
have no reason for regarding the indictmen, in the principal case as demurra-

ble, but the question now arises whether
the Statute of Limitations does not introduce a new requisite, that, namely,
the time laid should be within its period ; and here it is pertinent to consider the different rules relating to the
Statute which obtain respectively in civil
and criminal pleading. For an intelligent comprehension of this difference
and the true reason for it will show, it
is believed, the entire correctness of the
decision in the case before us. The
Statute of Limitations then, in civil
cases being required to be specially
pleaded (Brown v. Hancock, Cro. Car.
115 ; 1 W i. Saund. 159, with authorities; Sherwin v. Cartwright, Hutt. 109;
Angell on Limitations, 300; Thursbyv.
Warren, Cro. Car. 160 ; being the early
eases on the point, and lastly Trankersly
v. Robinson, Cro. Car. 163, in which the
law as it now is was first settled), while
in criminal ones it may be given in ev,dence under the general issue, it seems
to have been thought by some that
though a declaration in a civil suit was
not demurrable for alleging a time beyond the period of limitation, because
on a plea of the statute the plaintiff
might have brought his case within one
of the exceptions, or shown an acknowledgment, yet that the case the reverse with an indictment. Aad the
strongest argument which we may ascribe
to those who take this view, is perhaps
to this effect. That the rule of criminal
pleading permitting the statute to be
given in evidence under the general issue
was based upon the principle that its
committal within the statutory period
was so far of the essence of a crime that
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this must be shown by the prosecutor; tion it is now proposed, Fir.d, to cite
that it was not as in civil cases neces- some explanations which have been
sary for the defendant to assume the given of the difference between civil and
burden of alleging and proving the con- criminal pleading in regard to the Stattrary, and that an indictment which failed ute of Limitations, and to argue that the
to make this allegation was demurrable. natural difference between a crime and
Besides this precise and comprehensible a contract is sufficiently recognised oy
reason for holding a prosecutor to a releasing in criminal cases the rue racareful statement of his case, there are quiring the defendant to plead speciaily
to be found many vague assertions as to the statute, without going on to compel
"the greater strictness" of criminal the prosecutor in his indictment to negapleadings, &c., but these we may say tive this by anticipation; and that
here are, without more, of the very there is no occasion to make an excepslightest consequence, and call for no tion to the general rule applicable alike
notice. This is as far as we are able to to civil and criminal pleading, (vide
give it a fair presentation of one side of ante, p. 691 ; Spicer v. Matthews, Fortes(Vide infra, United que 375 ;) which allows the pleader to
tile
controversy.
States v. Watkins, for arguments excel- depart in his pleading and vary in his
lent if tile
question were res integra, but proof from the time first alleged.
Secondly, to examine more fully than
which prove too much in being applicable to civil as to criminal pleading, is done in the original case the authorithough perhaps not to the same degree ; ties, which have been cited against the
and JlfcLane v. State of Georgia, 4 Ga. ruling therein.
Under the first head comes the fol333.) On the other hand. Having found
that time lias not in general required to lowing from 1 Wins. Saund. 162:
be accurately stated or proved as stated ; "Perhaps the true ground of distinction
and knowing that in civil cases a date in between the Statute of Limitations and
the declaration beyond the statutory pe- Star. 31 Eliz. and other statutes limitriod is not ground of demurrer, the statute ing penal actions to a definite period may
being required to be specially pleaded, be this : the former statute limits those
the question before us is whether the actions where a debt or other cause of
difference between the time of the for- action is already vested in the plaintiff
mation of a contract and that of the by means of some contract or other
perpetration of a crime as affecting the transaction between the plaintiff and deessence of each is so wide that in the fendant prior to the bringing of the aclatter case we must hold that the gene- tion, but in penal actions the duty or
ral rule as to the pleading of time can- right of action attaches in the plaintiff
not apply. It may be taken to be ad- merely by bringing the action, anii did
mitted that the provisions of the Act not exigt in him before, and unless he
of Limitations do not form an excep- brings Ihis action within the time pre
tion or proviso to the act defining the scribed there is no right of action Vtcrime, to take the case before us, and tachied in him, therefore lie scents as
that it is not necessary to the com- much bound to proce the commencement
pleteness of the offence that it should of his action within time, which is the
have been committed within the sta- cause or consideration of it,in order to
tutory period, in the same sense that it entitle himself to a verdict, as a personi
is necessarv to the crime of burglary who brings a'sunipsit or dlblt i r gots
that it should have been committed in sold and delivered or money lhent, ant
the like, is to show the cause or considtle night.
Towards the resolution of this ques- eration or ts action to entitle him to a
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verdict, and if he fails therein it appears
that he has no cause of action. But the
Statute of Limitations (meaning that
applying to civil actions) "1admits the
cause or consideration of the action still
existing and merely discharges the defendant from the remedy, so that a promise within six years, without any other
consideration, is sufficient to revive the
action ; therefore, if he will take advantage of that circumstance it is necessary
he should plead the statute: 5 Burr. 260;
Quantock v. England, 3 T. 11, per BuLLEu, J., in Petrie v. White. If any distinction is to be taken between penal actions (the example given by Williams)
and criminal prosecutions, it will be to
the effect that though the right to the penalty does not exist till suit brought, a
crime has an independent being, and is
a crime, though no prosecution be ever
brought. Thus classing a prosecution
rather with an action on a contract, if
we follow Williams's line of thought.
The rule of pleading, however, which
permits the the Statute of Limitations to
be given in evidence under the general
issue as well in prosecutions as in penal
actions, shows it is believed that no
such distinction exists, and mutatis mutandis for "penal actions," "prosecutions" might be substituted in the above
passage without affecting its integrity.
See also in last edition note by Sir E.
V. Williams.
Says Williams (Wins. Saund. 159):
"In all other cases except such as are
founded on these Statutes (i. e., 21 Jac.
1, c. 5 and 32 H. 8, c. 2, relating to
civil suits) of Limitations, where an action is required by statute to be commenced within a limited time, it is the
duty of the plaintiff to prove that he has
complied with the terms of it, and if he
do not he will fail in his suit."
The above italics are ours ; it will be
noticed that the word "prove" is used
twice, and nothing is said about the
allegation of time. See further Stile v.
linch, Cro. Car. 404; Lee v. Rogers,

1 Levinz 110; Willkinson on Limitation of Actions 105 ; Gould'v. J7ohnson,
2 Salk. 422-3. In this connection the
case of Rex v. Treharne, 10 Mood. 0. C.
298, is of interest. Prisoner indicted for
forgery committed July 2d 1830. The
statute authorizing trial of the offence in the county where prosecution
was in fact brought did not go into operatioft till 20th July. BOLLAND, B.,
left it to the jury if they were satisfied
that the prisoner had committed the
forgery to say whether it was before or
after 20th July. Jury found that it was
after. Counsel moved in arrest ofjudgment that indictment on its face showed
there was no jurisdiction in court and
cited R= v. Napper, I Mood. C. C. 44,
(not relevant to our present discussion), and Rex v. Brown, M. & M.
more hereafter).
(of which
163,
This case was considered at a meeting
of all the judges (except PARE, J.,
VAUGHAN, B., and TAUNTON, J.,) in
Easter Term 1831, and they were unanimously of the opinion that as the forgery was the same offence before 20th
July 1830 as afterwards, and the statute only entitled the prosecutor to charge
in that county what before he must have
charged in another, but made no provision for varying the charge or introducing any additional statement ; whatever
charge would before the statute have
been sufficient in the county in which
the offence must have been then laid will
be sufficient in the county in which trial
is laid, and the conviction was therefore
approved.
Secondly. The following authorities
have been cited against the doctrine laid
down in the principal case:
1. Wharton's American Criminal Law
436; citing United States v. Watkins, 3
Cr. C. 0. 442 ; (which relies upon Rex v.
Fearnley, 1 Term Rep. 320, Rex v.
Saunders, 2 Strange 865 and Pugh v.
Unit.,d States
Robinson, 1 Term 116).
v. White, 5 Cr. 36, 60, 308; Cennzon
wealth v. Hutchinson, 2 Pars. 453; (over
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53; Hubbard v. State, 7 Porter 160 ;
Roberts v. State, 19 Ala. 521 ; Shelton
v. State, 1 Stew. & Port. 208 ; State v.
Bacon, 7 Vt. 219; State v. Baker, 34
Me. 52.
3. People v. Miller, 12 Cal. 294,
eiting Wharton's American Crim. Law;
State v. Beckwith, I Stew. 318 ; Shelton
". State, I Stew. & Par. 208 ; State v.
Roach, I How. Miss. Rep; Chitty Crim.
Law.
4. People v. Bryan, 19 La. Ann.,
citing two cases in the same state.
5. Chitty's Criminal Law; citing Gilb.
Ev. 243 ; 2 East 333, 362 ; 5 East 259 ;
1 Saund. 309 n. ; 5 Fitzg. 136 ; Bac.

Cr. C. C. 442; U. S. v. White, 5 Cr
38, 60, 308; Com'th v. Hutchinson, 2
Pars. 453, overruled by Com'th v. Rujiner, 28 Pa. St. 259.
U. S. v. Watkins is a case full upon
the point, one of the few among the arramarshalled against the doctrine of the
principal case, that are at all pertinent.
The facts were substantially the same
as those of U. S. v. Cooke, and the demurrer was for a like reason. It was
objected to the demurrer that advantage
of the limitation cannot be taken by
demurrer, because prosecutor would
thereby be precluded from replying according to the proviso of the act that the
defendant fled from justice within two
years. To which the court replied per
CRANCR, J. : "It has been said, that
the United States would thereby be precluded from replying the flight of the
defendant if such should have been the
fact. But that is not the fault of 'the
defendant; the United States have put
themselves in that situation by stating
the fact to have happened at a time beyond the day of limitation. They were
not bound to do so, for they might have
laid the day to be within the time of litnitation, and have proved a different day at
the trial ; and if the day proved should
be beyond the time of limitation, and the
United States could have shown that the
defendant fled within the two years after
committing the offence, they might have
given it in evidence or they might have
stated in the indictment the true time
and the facts which existed and went to

Abr. Usury K.
6. Starkie on Criminal Plead., ed. of
1828, p. 59, has precisely thesame passnge as . hitty 223, word for word, and
relies on King v. Stevens, 5 East 259,
for which vide infra.
436.
1. Wharton's Amer. Crim. L.
The Statute of Limitations may be
specially pleaded, or it may be taken
advantage of either by demurrer or on
the general issue : U. S. v. Watkins, 9

show that the defendant could not avail
himself of the limitation." Citing King
v. Fearnley, 1 T. R. 320.
United States v. White, 5 Cr. C. C.
41. Motion to quash indictment, hecause
statutory period had elapsed. Court refused to quash indiutment, hecause until
the facts shall appear upon the trial, it
cannot appear that the defendant was not
a person fleeing from justice, and therefore not entitled to the benefit of the

ruled by Commonwealth v. Ruffner, 28
Penna. St. 453. Wharton, H 275-8,
citing Rex v. Brown, M. & M. 163; State
v. McGrath, 4 Bennett (Mo.) 378. Whar.on, 455, citing 28 Penn. St. 259 ; State
v. Robinson, 9 Foster 374 (which relies
cn 4 Blackstone 306, citing Foster 249) ;
McLane v. State of Georgia, 4 Geo. 333,
(which relies upon Arch. Crim. P. & P.;
.'hitty'sCrim. Law; Rex v. Wheatley,
2 Burr.; State v. Beckwith, 1 Stew. 318;
United States v. Watkins, 3 Cr. C. C.
73; Hubbard v. State, 7 Ind. 160;
State v. Hussey, 7 Iowa 409 ; and Eatwood v. State, 18 Ind. 492.
2. 1 Arebbold Criminal Pleading and
Practice, Waterman's notes, 278 n.,
citing State v. Rust, 8 Black. 195;
itate v. Lassley, 7 Porter (Ala.)
526; State v. G. S., I Tyler 275; State
v. Roach, 2 Hay. 526; Erwin v. State,
13 Miss. 306; Cook v. State, 11 Geo.
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limitation of time, and if he is entitled
to its benefit he may have it upon the
plea or upon evidence under the general
issue.
Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 2 Pars.
45, was an authority only for the position that the Statute of Limitations must
be specially pleaded in criminal cases,
and has since been overruled.
Wharton, a 275-8. "1Where a time
is limited" (giving cases where a more
precise date must be laid) I"for preferring an indictment, time laid should
appear to be within time so limited:
Rex v. Brown, M. & M. 163; State v.
_llcGrath, 19 Mis. (4 Ben.) 378. To
these may be added cases where date is
essential under the Statute of Limitatons."
The first part of the above clause
(taken from Archbold Crim. P. & P.)
is not very happily expressed, and though
from the after-remark evidently not intended to refer to the Statute of Limitations, is properly susceptible of no other
meaning. We must, however, take it to
describe that class of cases where time is
Df the essence, where an act done at one
time is no offence, at another is a crime;
as breaking the Sabbath, burglary, or
take the example which the author cites
-Rex v. Brown-which was an indictment under a statute making it penal
to signal to smugglers during the nighttime between September 21st and April
Ist. Time laid was 8th March. Objection taken that indictmdnt did not expressly say, between 21st September and
lst April. Motion in arrest of judgment
refused. State v. .fcGrath contains a
dictum which is as follows: says RYLAND, J., I I"It is not important as to
what day is alleged or what day is
proved so that the time in the indictment
is within the period prescribed for limiting the prosecution and the proof is of
a day before the finding of the bill of
indictment by the grand jury, and within
the period prescribed for limitation."
A careless statement on its face, for,

to make no other criticism, it neglects
to say that the time allegedmust be before
indictment brought.
455. "The Statute of
Wharton,
Limitations (28 Penna. St. 259) may
be taken advantage of on the general
issue, or when it appears on the recora
by motion in arrest of 'judgment, or
on motion to quash." The difference
between a motion in arrest of judgment
and a demurrer in this connection is
so obvious as scarcely to require comment, but it may be said that some of
the English cases hold that a time in
indictment laid beyond the statutory
period is not a reason for arresting
judgment upon a general verdict, the
court going so far as to presume that,
though a time beyond the statute is alleged, a time within must have been
proved: (Lee v. Clark, 2East333.) And
Com'th v. Ruffner, 28 Pa. St. 259, holds
perfectly consistently with English authority that on a specialverdict finding the
offence to have been committed at a date
beyond the statutory period, judgment
must be entered for defendant though
the statute was not pleaded. The learned
judge lays some emphasis on the fact
of the inconsistency between indictment
laying date within statutory period and
verdict finding date without that limit,
the verdict not showing that the defendant was guilty "1in manner and form as
he stood indicted." But it is submitted
that the verdict in criminal cases is
everything and in general the allegation
of time nothing ; that this discrepancy,
therefore, is not important, and that the
judgment should go according to the
verdict. In all other respects the decision is entirely in accordance with the
older law.
State v. Robinson, 9 Foster 274motion to quash. "Now it is an established law of criminal pleading that
where the time when an act charged
was done, is material either as constituting an element of the crime, or as affording to the accused a bar to the pro-
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ceeding, it must be accurately stated,
and a variance between allegation and
proof is fatal. The rule has been illustrated by reference to Stat. 7 Win. III."
(in this statute there are no exceptions :
vide infra), "limiting to three years prosecutions for certain acts of treason : 4
Blacks. Com. 306 ;" (says BLACKSTONE,
" but sometimes the time may be very
material, where there is any situation in
point of time assigned for the prosecution
of offenders, as by the Stat. 7 Win. III.
c. 3, &c." Refers to Foster 249, which
is merely a citation of Stat. 7 Win. III.)
On this precise ground the time when
crime was charged in the indictment to
have been committed, is material, and
on trial must be shown in proof, but
not being proved as alleged, the defendant "must be acquitted." This case
seems to support Judge Lpwis's position
in Com'th v. Ruffner.
McLane v. State of Georgia. 4 Ga.
333: Motion in arrest of judgment :
" That the indictment showed upon its
face, that it was barred by the Statute
of Limitations, and did not show anything by which the effect of the statute
could be avoided." The court was asked
to presume that it was proved on the
trial that the defendant was within one
of the exceptions to the statute. This
the court refused to do, giving as authority Rex v. lTieatlg, 2 Burr. 1127,
tmotion in arrest of judgment. Indictment was for selling short measure of
beer, held not to be indictable offence as
de-crihed in indictment, and Ld. AIAssFsrmr.i',

in his opinion, says : "In

a cri-

miil charge there is no latitude of intntion to include anything more than
is charged ; the charge must be explicit
enough to support itself") ; and went on
to say that where a time is limited for
preferring an indictment, the time laid
shouhl appear to be within the time so
limited : citing Arch. Crim. P. & P. 14 ;
ride i, ra, p. 697; Chitty Cr. Law 223;
vide iqf'a, p. 698 ; and State v. Beckwitlh,
I Stew. 318. (Indict. found October 1826.

1826- -motion in
Date day of arrest of judgment. Statute tf Limitations was six months for one count, and a
year (or more) for another; says SAFFOLD, J. : " One entire year could not
have elapsed, but the doctrine is that
whenever the time is any way material it
must be averred, the indictment will be
vitiated by a repugnancy as to time, &c."
This is a case of defective statement, and
clearly bad, and would have been so, if
the Statute of Limitations had never existed.) " 0n the score of principle,"
the court in McLane v. The State of
"
Georgia, go on to say, " we think that
it was incumbent on the prosecuting
officer to have alleged in the indictment the particular exception on which
he relied to prevent the operation of
the statute, so it might affirmanzely
appear that the defendant was liable
under the law to be arrested, tried and
convicted for the offence, and for the
further reason that he might be prepared
at the trial to traverse all the material
allegations made by the state against
him." And the court was unwilling to
apply to criminal cases the rule in civil
cases.
U. S. v. Watkins, vide supra 694.
Hubbard v. State, 7 Ind. 160, contains
a dictum to the effect that where indictment may be barred by lapse of time,
alleged date should be within the period
allowed.
ilatwood v. State, 18 Ind. 492, Sta.-.
ute of Limitations may be proved 'rnder
the general issue in criminal cases.
State v. Hassey, 7 Iowa 409, is to the
effect that the Statute of Limitations in
criminal cases is not subject of deniurrer, because there might be an exception, and the exception need not L-e
stated in indictment.
2. Archlbol Crim. Plead an" Prac.
278 n., Waterman's ed., "Where the
statute limits the time of pro, (tion,
the
time as averred in the indictwntet 'hlmuld
appear to be wvithin
the limit." This is
an American note; the only thing in the
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text at all connected with the point, is
that sentence which Wharton quotes
(vide supra 695.)
State v. Rust, 8 Blackf. 195, "Where
the time for, &c.," as above. Relies on
i Chit. C. L. 223, and State v. G. S.,
I Tyler 295.
State v. G. S., I Tyler 295. Date in
indictment "1March 2d one thousand
eight." Insensible and of course bad.
State v. Lassley, 7 Porter (Ala.) 526,
Demurrer for not laying a certain date
in one count. Dictum that certainty of
time was not necessary. This is not
law. Judgment entered on another good
count.
State v. Roach, 2 Hayw. 526, no day
stated. Of course had.
Roberts v. State, 19 Ala. 526, no date
[aid.
Shelton v. State, 1 Stewart & Porter
208. All that is decided is, that under
an indictment charging an assault on
10th, evidence is admissible of assaults
on 3d and 4th of same month. Nothing is said of Statute of Limitations.
State v. Bacon, 7 Ver. 219, no venue.
General statement by judge that indictment should give time and place.
State v. Baker, 34 Maine 52, allegation was uncertain "on or about a certain day."
Erroinv. State, 19 Miss. 306, time omitted.
Cook v. State, II Geo. 53: Indictment brought September Term 1851.
Date May Ist 1851 and divers other
days. NISBET, J.: "Any day previous
to the finding of the indictment will do,
except when time enters into the nature
of the offence, and the offence may be
proven on any day within the period of
limitations dating back from the finding
of the bill:" Hubbard v. State, vide
supra.
3. People v. Miller, 12 Calif. 294.
Error in entering judgment against
prisoner on indictment showing the offence to have been committed more than
threa y-ars before indictment brought.

The verdict was guilty of manslaughter;
and Statute of Limitations enacting
that 11An indictment for any other felony than murder must be found within
three years after its commission." TEnxY, J. : "It is generally true that every
essential fact must be stated in the indictment, and this means every fact material to the offence of which the party
may be convicted, and the allegation of
a day within the period of limitation is
material whenever the offence is subject
to limitation: Wharton Am. Cr. Law,
pp. 111, 114. * * * It is true that the
Statute of Limitations excludes from
computation the time the defendant may
be out of the state, but the rule is that
this exception must be stated in pleading. Primdfaciethe lapse of time is a
good defence, and if the statutory exception is relied on the state should set
it up. This is the rule in civil pleadings
in our system, and it is not less strict in
criminal cases. The case in 9 Cow.
(People v. Santvoord), cited by the Attorney-General, seems to be against this
view, but that case stands opposed to
well settled precedents in English and
American courts." The contrary seems
to be held in State v. Beckwith, 1 Stew.
318, vide supra;Shelton v. State, I Stew.
& Por. 208, vide supra; State v. Roach,
2 Hay. 540, vide supra: 1 How. (Miss.)
260: (Date in this case was A.D. 1030,
held to be impossible) ; Wh. Cr. Law,
vide supra ; I Chitty Cr. Law, vide infra.
Its unqualified language would alone
lead us to question the value of this
opinion; the fact that most of its authorities do not sustain it, or are not
themselves supported by those upon
which they in their turn rely, together
with the statement, 'that this is the
rule in ciN il pleadings in our system,"
&c., which negatives the rule that in
civil cases the Statute of Limitations
must be specially pleaded, more than
confirm that doubt.
4. State v. Bryan, 19 (La.) An. 435.
Demurrer that indictment did not neg
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ative prescription which on its face had
accrued by alleging either that the crime
was not discovered or that the prisoner
had fled from justice. Demurrer sustained, court relying on two local authorities, which were motions in arrest
of judgment.
5. 1 Chitty's Crim.Law 223. "When
the time is material, as of the death
in case of homicide, or where the
time for the prosecution is limited as
under 7 Win. III. c. 3, which provides
that no prosecution shall be had for certain treasons therein mentioned unless
the bill of the indictment is found within
three years after the crime is committed,
the time as averred in the indictment
should appear to be within the limitation, but it is not necessary to aver that
it oc/urred within that period." Not
one of the authorities, as we will show,
which are cited for it, sustain this position. They are as follows: King v.
Stevens and Agnew, 5 East 259, indictmentunder a statute of Geo. III., against
certain persons -for receiving presents,
must show that presents were received
during tenure of office. Held, that indictment alleging a tenure until a certain
day, and receipt of presents on that day,
sufficient.
1 Saunders 309 : Statement of dates
necessary in an indictment against one
for practising a trade without a seven
years' al)prenticeship according to statute.
J3aynlham v. Matthews, Fitz. 130;
Declaration on promissory note of a
certain date: Plea, usury. It was oh,ected to plea that it did not aver that
note was given since late act as to
usury. Resolved by court, that hy date
of note it appears so. And by RAYMboND,

C. J. : "The

plaintiff having de-

clared on a note of special date, could
not give in evidence a note bearing a
different (late. Plaintil given leave to
discottinue." This belongs to the well
defined class of cases in which time must
be preciely laid because it is a matter
of particular description.

Bac. Abr. Usury K., no authority, as
time is of essence in case of usury.
Gilbert!243-on p. 265 is the only
reference to point iu question, and is authority the other way, vide supra 691.
Lee v. Clarke, 2 East 333; 2 East 362,
an authority against the author's proposition if relevant at all.
This it is believed disposes of all the
cases cited against the ruling in United
States v. Cooke; and it only remains to
consider,
Thirdly. The learned judge's dictum to
the effect that time not being of the essence of the crime, the prosecutor in the
case even of a Statute of Limitations
without any exceptions, might allege a
date beyond the statutory period, being
at liberty to prove one within that time.
Such a statute is of course rare. 7 Wim.
III, a. 3, is perhaps the solitary example,
and under itthere are no authorities on
this point, but a reference to Lo'eick's
Case, 13 State Trials 267; Townley's
Case, 18 Id. 486 ; Lord Balinrino's
Case, 18 Id. 486, where a question was
made on another section of the act than
that which prescribes the limitation, it
will be seen that the judges seemed to
deem it of no consequence what date was
laid in indictment ; the dates, as a matter of fact, were all within the statutory
period ; vide also East Pleas of Crown,
C. 2, s. 60 ; Colledye's Case, 8 St. Trials
262, and Charnock's Case, 12 Td. 137898.
The result of the foregoing analysis
shows that the notion of an inl ictment
being demurrable for laying a time beyond the statutory period, is, with the
exception of the loose statement of two
or three text writers, of recent and
native growth, and we have the very
singular spectacle of an American court
in this century being asked to sustain
a demurrer which in the strictest age
of the Etglish coniot law was regarded
as containing only a frivolous objet rion.
it.

PRESTON v. HULL.

SuPreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.
CHARLES H. C. PRESTON v.

. D. HULL.

A bond executed by two persons, with a blank in the bond where the name of
tei obligee is to be inserted, and delivered, in this condition, to one of the persons
by the other, with parol authority, to borrow money upon it and to insert the name
of the person from whom the money is obtained, in the blank, as the obligee, is a
m3re nullity and is not the deed of the -person so delivering it.

An agent cannot be empowered by parol to insert the name of the obligee in
such an instrument.

The case of Texira v. Evans decided not to be law in Virginia.
ONE B. F. Mantz, being indebted to the appellant, Charles H.
U. Preston, in about the sum of $600, informed the said Preston
that he did not have the money to pay him, but said to him that
he could borrow that amount in Marion for him if he, Preston,
would execute his note for that sum. He expressed the belief that
he could get the money from Gov. Fayette McMullin. Preston
and Mantz then executed the following paper:

Marion, Oct. 10th 1868.
Sixty days after date we promise and bind ourselves, our heirs,
&c., to pay $600
for value rec'd. of him as witness our
hands and seals.
CHAs. H. C. PRESTON. [SEAL.]
B. F. MANTZ.
[SEAL.]
This paper was then delivered to Mantz with instructions to
borrow that amount from McMullin if he could, but if he could
not get it from him, then he was instructed to borrow the money
from any person who would loan the amount; and he was authorized, by parol, to insert the name of that person in the blank left
in the paper above, as the obligee and to deliver it to him. Mantz
failed to obtain the money from McMullin but did procure it from
D. D. Hull, and thereupon inserted his name in the blank and
delivered the instrument, thus filled up, to Hull.
Hull brought an action of debt upon this paper in tho Circuit
Court of Smyth county, Virginia. The suit abated as to Mantz,
who had removed from the state. Preston appeared and pleaded
payment and non est factum, with an affidavit, appended to the
latter plea, setting forth the circumstances connected with the
execution of the paper. Upon these pleas issue was joined. The
above being the facts in proof, the cause was submitted to a jury.
On the motion of the plaintiff the court gave the following in-
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struction: "If the jury shall believe from the evidence that the
defendant executed the single bill in the declaration in this cause
mentioned, and delivered the same to his co-obligor B. F. Mantz
with a blank in said single bill, where the name of the obligee D.
D. Hull, the plaintiff, is now inserted, with the understanding that
the said B. F. 'Mantz was to procure money on the said single bill
and to write the name of the person, from whom the money should
be procured, in said blank as obligee and to deliver the said single
bill to such obligee, and if the jury shall further believe from the
evidence that the said B. F. Mantz procured the money from the
said D. D. Hull, the obligee aforesaid in the said single bill, and
wrote the name of the said D. D. Hull in the single bill and delivered the same to the said Hull, then the said single bill aforesaid
is binding upon the said Preston, and the jury must find the issue
for the plaintiff."
The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff
and the court entered up judgment accordingly. From that judgment this appeal was taken.
J. V. & J. P. Sheffey, for the appellants, cited 2 Rob. Practice
9 to 17; Shepherd's Touch. 68; Hibblewhite v. Meliforine, 6 M.
& W. 215; United States v. Nelson, 2 Brock. 64; Asbury v.
Calloway, 1 Wash. 72; Harrissonv. Tiernans,4 Rand. 177; B/hea
v. Gibson, 10 Gratt. 215.
J. H. Gilmore, for the appellees, cited Texi'a v. Evans, as cited
in 1laster v. -Miller,1 Anst. 228; White v. V'ermont & M1fass. B.
R. Company, 21 How. 575; K~iap v. llfaltby, 13 Wend. 589;
Bank of Buffalo v. Kortwright, 22 Wend. 348; Eaghcton v.
Gutteridge, 11 M. & W. 465, and note; Jones's Assignee v.
Thomas, 21 Gratt. 96; Woolley v. Constant, 4 Johns. 54; Smith
v. Cracher, 5 Mass. 538.
STAPLES, J.-A bond is a deed whereby the obligor promises to
pay a certain sum of money to another at a day appointed: 2
Black. 346. An obligor and obligee are essential to the existence
and constitution of such an instrument. It is not indispensable
that the party to whom the promise is made should be mentioned
Ceo nomine," that his name of baptism and surname shall be
given, but he must be in some unmistakeable manner d(,ignatc(l in
the instrument. A writing, though executed with all the- ,,Ilemnities of a deed, without such obligee is a mere nullity. It ilhlo>es
no liability upon the party issuing it. It confers no rights upon
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him who receives or holds it. It is not simply an imperfect deed.
It is no deed at all. It only becomes a deed when the name of
an obligee is inserted, and delivery made by the obligor or by some
one legally authorized by him. If the blank is filled by an agent,
then the agent as certainly makes the deed as though the entire
obligation had been written, signed, sealed and delivered by him.
His act binds a principal not before bound. It creates a contract
having no previous existence. It is true the act in question is
merely the insertion of a name. Still its effect is to impart vitality to a piece of waste paper. It calls new rights and obligations
into existence. It is followed by all the consequences resulting
from the execution of the most solemn instrument.
The argument sometimes advanced, that there can be no danger
or difficulty in conferring the power by parol when nothing remains
to be done but the insertion of a name, to render the instrument
complete, does not meet the real issue. The question is not one
of trust and confidence reposed, but of power conferred. In the
numerous and diversified transactions of mankind, agencies of the
gra;vest character are often created by parol. A partner may
bind his copartner to any amount for any matter within the scope
of the partnership, by a note executed in the partnership name.
The authority of an agent to sell land of his principal may be
conferred without writing, and the latter may thus be bound irrevocably for his entire estate. In the execution and endorsement
of negotiable paper, powers may be and are often conferred, by
parol, upon agents involving liabilities to the amount of millions.
The law recognises such agencies as essential to the commerce of
the world. Why may not the agent in all these cases impose the
same liabilities by deed in the name of his principal? If he may
sell the land-fix the price and agree upon all the terms of the
contract-why may he not perform the mere formal act of executing the conveyance? The answer is, the authority of the
agent must be commensurate with the act he performs. The
stream can never be higher than its source. If the act of the
agent is the execution and delivery of a deed, his authority must
be by deed. It does not matter how much of the instrument may
have been written by the principal, if it is a mere nullity when it
leaves his hands, and only becomes operative by act of the agent,
upon every principle of sound legal reasoning the result must
inevitably be the same. Whenever the agent undertakes to bind
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his principal by an act, his authority, in point of dignity, must be
co-equal with the act. The question is not, therefore, whether it
is expedient that a mere parol agent shall have the power to fill
the blank with the name of an obligee-but whether it can be done
and sustained without violating well established principles of law.
A little reflection will show that these principles are not without
substantial reasons to support them. At common law a sealed
instrument imposed peculiar liabilities. It was not affected by any
Statute of Limitations. It operated as an estoppel. The obligor
was not permitted to aver any want of consideration to avoid it;
nor could he defeat an action at law thereon by showing any failure
of title or breach of contract or mistake or fraud in the procuremeat of the bond. It is true that some of these obstacles have
been removed by statute, and parties may now defend themselves
in the common-law courts upon grounds purely equitable, but both
in Virginia and in England, sealed instruments confer rights and
impose obligations which can never grow out of the execution of
any mere parol contracts. It is reasonable and just, therefore,
that a party setting up a deed and seeking to enforce it shall be
prepared to show, if necessary, that it is the act of the grantor
himself, or of some one empowered by an instrument of equal
dignity with the deed.
When the writing which is the subject of this controversy left
the hands of Preston, it was not a deed. It certainly did not
constitute a contract. It was indeed of no more value than the
paper which contained it. When it passed into the possession of
Hull, it had, in some way, become a deed and a binding contract
according to the theory of counsel. How did it so become a
deed ? Certainly not by the act of Preston, as be was then absent
and was not even informed of the transaction until some time
afterwards. It was the act of the agent which gave efficacy to the
paper and created an obligation by deed not before in existence.
At the time Preston signed the paper it was the expectation of
both 'Mantz and Preston that the money could be obtained from
Governor McMullin; but failing in that, it may be reasonably
inferred, it was expected to borrow it elsewhere, and authority
was given to Mantz, the agent, to fill the blank in the bond with
the name of the person making the loan. Governor McMullin did
rot advance the money as was expected, and the arrangement was
made with the plaintiff Hull, and his name inserted as obligee in
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the bond. The agent did not simply fill the blank with a name
previously agreed on by Preston, but he called into existence a new
and unknown party, and bound his principal by a contract with him.
In this respect the case is much stronger than that of the simple insertion of a name already declared by the obligor. A deed must
exist before it can be delivered. That is clear. If an obligation,
complete and perfect, be delivered by the obligor to a third person
for the use of the obligee, it is the deed of the obligor immediately.
The deed only becomes inoperative by the refusal of the obligee to
receive it. In such case the delivery is the act of the principal or
obligor and not of the third person or agent: Skipwith's Executor
v. Cunningham, 8 Leigh 282.
Whenever, however, the principal commits to the agent an
instrument that is not complete and operative at the time, with a
blank for the obligee or the sum to be paid, to be filled by the
agent and according to his discretion, the act of mind, the disposing power, which are always essential and efficient ingredients
of the deed, are the agent's, and the instrument takes effect by his
act of execution and delivery, and is binding upon the printipal or
not according to the authority conferred on the agent.
If Preston had endorsed his name upon a piece of blank paper
with scrolls attached, and the agent had, afterwards, added the
entire obligation under the previous verbal instructions of Preston,
the agent in that case would have performed an act of no greater
dignity than he has in this. The trust reposed may be greater
in the one case than in the other. But the result is the same.
In each case the principal becomes bound by an obligation created
by act of the agent.
If the name of the obligee may be inserted, why may not the
sum also, and if these may be supplied, why not the mere formal
parts of the deed? If we once depart from the rule, how is the
line to be drawn consistently with the preservation of any rule at
all? If we say that the name or sum may be inserted by the
agent. will it not lead us, inevitably, to the doctrine that the entire
deed may be executed by the agent also ? We shall be carried
on, step by step, if we mean to be consistent, until we have destroyed all the well-settled distinctions between sealed and unsealed
instruments.
It is asked what good purpose is to be subserved by these distinctions. It is sufficient to say that they exist-having their
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origin in well established principles. In the language of Chief
Justice MARSHALL they have taken such firm hold of the law they
,an only be removed by the power of legislation. We must bear
in mind that one change in the law, often involves the necessity
of others. Much mischief ensues-many embarrassments often
occur in the administration of justice, from the disregard of some
well-established rule of law, intimately identified by a long course
of decisions, with others which, in their turn, are interwoven with
the entire framework of society.
If deeds are to be placed in the particulars now contended for,
upon the same footing with parol contracts, there are other distinctions between them that ought to be abolished. The same
act of limitation should apply to a bond as to a promissory note.
The defendant should be permitted to show a want of consideration in one case as in the other, and, above all, sound policy, it
seems to me, requires that the whole technical doctrine of estoppel
by deed should be greatly modified, if not entirely abolished. It
has been suggested that the doctrine of estoppel in pais might
apply to a transaction like this and the obligor estopped to deny
the bond.

It was said by Judge GIBSON, of the Supreme Court

of Pennsylvania, in relation to a writing! executed in blank and
afterwards filled by a parol agent, if it could be sustained at all,it would be upon the ground of estoppel in pais. But so far as I
am informed he is the only judge who has suggested the idea.
No reference is made to it by Baron PARKE, or Chief Justice
MARSIIALL, or Judge CABELL, or by the Supreme Court of the
United States, or that of New York, in the cases before them.
This proposition, carried to its legitimate results, will show that a
mere parol agent may always bind the principal by a deed. If
the obligor, who trusts his agent with a writing with blanks as to
the names or sums, is estopped to deny that it is his bond-when
the blanks are afterwards filled by the agent-so must also the
obligor who trusts his agent merely with his name and a scroll
attached-when the entire obligation is afterwards added. In
truth the doctrine of estoppel has no application to the case. The
party advancing his money is put on his guard by the face of the
paper. iHe sees that it is not a deed, and le is bound, at his peril,
to inquire into the authority of the agent to make it a deed. Ile
is presumed to know the law. He musl know that the agent's
authority must be by deed. If he is misled, it is by his own folly
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and the act of the agent. It cannot be justly said that he has
been deceived by the party whose signature is attached to the
writing
Having thus considered the principles affecting the case, lct us
see how stand the authorities bearing upon the question.
In England one of the earliest cases is that of Texira v. Evans,
decided by Lord MANSFIELD. We have no contemporaneous
report of the case. All our information is derived from the statement of an English judge, made long after Texira v. Evans was
decided. However, the case was questioned at an early day by the
most eminent judges and lawyers-and has been, long since, entirely overruled in the English courts. I will not attempt to
comment upon or even cite the various cases. A brief reference
to that of Hibblewhite v. . lf orine, 6 M. & W. 200, will be
sufficient. This case was decided by the Court of Exchequer in
1840, the opinion being delivered by Baron PARKE, than whom no
more eminent common-law judge ever adorned the English bench;
one question arising in the case was whether the writing was a
deed or mere note-it was held to be a deed. He then said:
"Assuming the instrument to be a deed, it was wholly improper if
the name of the vendee was left out; and to allow it to be afterwards filled up by an agent appointed by parol, and then delivered
in the absence of the principal as a deed, would be a violation of
the principle that an attorney to execute and deliver a deed for
another must himself be appointed by deed." He further declares, "The only case cited in favor of the validity of such a
deed, is Texira v. Evans, which is not sustained by the authorities
and which cannot be considered to be law." After reviewing the
various cases, and showing they are not in conflict with his views,
he proceeds, "It is enough to say there is none that shows that an
instrument which when executed is incapable of having any operation and is no deed, can afterwards become a deed by being completed and delivered by a stranger in the absence of the party
who executed it, and unauthorized by instrument under seal."
It has been suggested that this authority has been much weakened if not overthrown by the case of Eagleton v. Gutteridge,
11 M. & W. 465. This is an entire mistake. The only point
there decided was, that a complete and operative power of attorney
was not invalidated by the insertion of the attorney's Christian
name in the absence of the principal. The instrument was good
VoL. XXI.-46
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without the addition and was not affecte d by it.

The opinion of

Baron PARKE in Hibblewhite v. itelorine, was sustained by the
unanimous decision in Enthoven v. Hoyle, 13 C. B. 373, one of
the latest cases, and is now the settled law of England: 2 Starkie
481; Buller's Nisi Prius 281.
In the United States the authorities are conflicting. The
volumes containing the various cases are not to be found in this
place.
Many of the decisions are cited and distinguished in
Rob. Prac., vol. 2 (new edition) 86, to which I refer. It seems
that in New York and South Carolina the courts have followed
the doctrines of Lord MANSFIELD, in Texira v. .Evans. In
Pennsylvania formerly the same rule was adopted, but in Wallace
v. Harmsted, 3 Harris 462-8, Chief Justice GIBSON, speaking
for the court, expressed very grave doubts of the correctness of
Texira v. Evans, and'said that case could only be sustained, if at
all, on the ground the obligor had estopped himself by an act in
pais.
In Massachusetts I am unable to say what the rule is. The
case of Smith v. Cracher, 5 Mass. 538, relied upon by counLel for
defendant in error, does not decide, if it even raises the question
involved in this controversy. There the instrument was a complete
obligation when signed by the obligor, and the alteration subsequently made was wholly immaterial. Judge PARsoNs, however,
in delivering his opinion, went far beyond the case before him.
He declared, and this is now relied on, "That the party executing
a bond, knowing there are blanks in it to be filled up by inserting
'particular names or things, must be considered as assenting that
the blanks may be thus filled up after he Las executed the bond."
Chief "Justice MARSHALL, in United States v. Nelson, hereafter
to be considered, plainly shows that Judge PARSONS had reference
to an operative instrument when executed, but having blanks to be
filled with names or things already agreed on by the parties, and
not to an instrument with a blank such as deprived it of all obligatory force when signed. A blank of such vital importance that a
pa'per, while it so remained, was a mere nullity, does not seem
to have been in the view of Judge PARSONS.
I have thus named the states which are supposed to follow Texzra
v. E van&s. There may be others. It is impossible to say in the absence of the reports of the various states of the Union. On the
other hand, the Supreme Court of North Carolina, when the bencth
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was adorned bythe genius and learning of a GASTON and a RUFFIN,
has not hesitated to follow the later English cases, overruling the
decision of Lord MANSFIELD. In .Davenport v. Sleight, 2 Dev.
& Bat. 381, an instrument signed and sealed by the defendant
in blank and delivered to an agent with directions to purchase a
vessel for the defendant and fill up the instrument with the price
to be agreed on and deliver, it was held not a good bond even
though the defendant declared his approbation of what bad been
done. The court considered the insertion of the sum in the blank
space intended to consummate the deed as done without legal authority, and therefore that the instrument is void as a bond. And
with this ruling it is believed agree the cases in Kentucky, Maryland, Texas and Tennessee.
The same principle is laid down in Parsons on Contracts, vol. 2,
723, in the following terms, and is there supported by a strong
array of cases: el If there are blanks left in a deed affecting its
meaning and operation in a material way and they are filled up.
after execution, there should be a re-execution and a new acknowledgment."
In the case of the United States v. NYelson, 2 Brock. 64, Chief
Justice MARSHALL did not hesitate to express his entire concurrence with the later English decisions. In that case the printed
form of an official bond had been signed by the securities with
blanks for the date and penalty. It was afterwards signed by the
principal, and the blanks filled in the absence of the securities,
without their knowledge and without any authority from them
other than might be implied from their having executed the paper
with intention to bind themselves as sureties and with full knowledge of the object of the bond. The Chief Justice held that the
instrument was not binding upon the sureties. In the course
of his opinion, he said no sum being mentioned in the bond the
defendants were no more bound by the instrument they had executed, at the time of its execution, than if the paper had been all
blank. He maintained there are certain differences between sealed
and unsealed instruments which made it difficult to apply the principles of one contract to the other, that these differences and the
rules founded on them, though originating in a different state of
society, have taken such fast hold of the law that they can be
separated only by the power of legislation.
Throughout the opinion he kept carefully in view the distinction
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between an instrument which is a mere nullity and imposes no ob
ligation whatever when it is signed and delivered, and an instrument which is complete when executed, and the alteration is
merely in the words or in filling blanks with names or things
agreed on and by consent of the parties. And he showed that the
cases relied on as sustaining the validity of blank bonds afterwards
filled up were all of this latter character. He admitted that the
Supreme Court of the United States in Speake v. United States, 9
Cranech 28, had gone very far in deciding that an obligation may
be originally created by virtue of an authority merely implied from
the sealing and delivery of a paper which in its existing state
could avail nothing, and he thought it probable the time would
come when that court might completely abolish in this particular
the distinction between sealed and unsealed instruments. But no
one reading the opinion carefully can fail to perceive that the
learned Chief Justice did not incline to this view, and that he
intended to adhere to the doctrines of the common law as expounded in England. It is to be observed that the case of Hibblewhite v. leiorine was decided many years afterwards, so that
the Chief Justice arrived at his conclusions without the aid of the
able and exhaustive opinion of Baron PARKE.
The case of White v. F-er. &-Mass. B. B. Co., 21 How. 575, has
been also much relied on as authority for the defendant in error.
It was there held that the bonds of a railroad company, payable in
blank, might be filled up by any bond fide holder and made payable to his own order. But the reason assigned by the court is,
that the usage and practice of railroad companies, of capitalists and
business men of the country, and the decisions of the courts, had
impressed upon this class of securities the character of negotiability. Being negotiable they were of course governed by the
laws applicable to such instruments, one of which is they may
be executed, endorsed or altered under a mere parol authority.
In the course of his opinion, Mr. Justice NELSON alluded to the
case of Texira v. Evans. He admitted it was not the law in England. He said however, that courts of the highest authority in
this country have followed Lord MANSFIELD, and have not hesitated
to meet the fears expressed by Baron PARKE, that the effect would
be to make bonds negotiable, by admitting the consequence. But
the Supreme Court of the United States have not yet gone that
far, and Mr. Justice NELSON admits that Chief Justice LARSHALL
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was unwilling to do so. It is conceded on all sides that to follow
the rule declared in Texira v. Evans, is to destroy all distinction
between deeds and mere parol contracts. Are we prepared for
that in Virginia? No one, familiar with the opinion of the judges
and the decisions of our courts, can hesitate to affirm that the disposition here, is to follow the common-law doctrines and preserve
unimpaired the distinction between sealed and unsealed instruments.
In Harrissonv. Tiernans, 4 Rand. 177, the question was as to
the validity of certain instruments taken by the sheriff as bailbonds. They were in the usual form, signed and sealed by the
obligors, but without any sum being mentioned in the penalty of
the bonds. Counsel in arguing, endeavored to apply the principles
governing bills of exchange and promissory notes, according to
which a man who signs his name to a blank piece of paper will,
under certain circumstances, be considered as giving authority to
fill it up with a valid instrument. But this court said, Judge
CABELL delivering the opinion, that bills of exchange and promissory notes are not deeds, and authority to execute them may be
given by parol, or even inferred from circumstances, but a bailbond is a deed which cannot take effect without delivery, and that
delivery can only be made by the party himself or by some attorney
legally authorized by deed for that purpose. What are we to
understand by this language ? that the blanks in the bonds might
have been filled by a mere parol agent? Clearly not. Judge
CABELL means that this could only be done and the instruments
delivered by the parties themselves or by attorneys authorized by
deed. If he does not mean this, his language does not admit of
any fair and reasonable interpretation. He declares that the bondif
are wholly inoperative by reason of the failure to insert a penalty.
I beg to know what substantial difference there is between an instrument confessedly a mere nullity for the want of a sum to be paid;
and an instrument which is a mere nullity for the want of an
obligee to whom to be paid. The authority to execute and deliver
or complete and deliver such an instrument must of necessity ba
the same in both cases. In Oleaton v. ( hamblis, 6 Rand. 92, this
question arose incidentally. According to my understanding, the
proposition there announced, is that any material alteration of a
deed invalidates it, unless made under such circumstances of
consent by the obligor as amount to a re-execution or re-acknow..
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ledgement of the writing. The reason is obvious, the alteration
changes the contract. The writing is no longer the deed of the
obligor or grantor. In its altered state it must be re-executed by
him, and then it takes effect from the re-execution. Now whether
it be the re-execution of an altered deed, or the execution of a
new one or the completion of an imperfect one, there can be no
well-defined distinction, and the same principles must govern in
each case in respect to the act necessary to a valid instrument.
I am aware that in Bhea v. Gibson, 10 Gratt. 215, 220, Judge
SAINIUEs admitted there was some conflict of authority upon this
point. He however cited a number of cases as deciding that the
filling of blanks in a bond will not give it validity unless under
circumstances which make a new execution thereof. And among
the cases thus cited are those I have just mentioned. Why they
are not authority for us I am at a loss to understand, but conceding they are not, they clearly show the leaning of the Virginia
courts and judges, and they indicate a purpose to adhere to the
common-law doctrines until changed by legislation. The cases of
Clegg v. Lemessurier, 15 Gratt. 108, and Stincheomb v. Marsh,
Id. 211, though not involving the point in controversy here, exhibit the same tendency of our courts in this class of questions.
In one of these cases the counsel having cited the decisions of
eleven states of the Union to show that the affixing of a scroll to
the name, is of itself sufficient evidence of its being intended as a
seal-the court said, however desirable conformity with the different
states might be, it furnished no sufficient reason for reversing our
course of decisions. In the other case the question turned upon
the operation and effect of a power of attorney and of acts done
by a sub-agent thereunder. Counsel in urging upon the court to
give a liberal construction to the instrument, had suggested that a
spirit of self reliance and directness of purpose will prompt the
people of this age and country to disregard the formalities of
conveyancing and the rules of law by which they are prescribed.
Judge LEE said this constituted no sufficient reason, nor furnished
any adequate authority to change the law or overthrow plain, intelligible and well-settled principles. That is the province of the
legislature not of the judiciary. I think these cases strongly
illustrate the reluctance of this court to reverse its course of decisions because other states may have adopted a different rule or
because of casual instances of hardship occurring in individual
cases.
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In the present case it seems to me to be the safest course to adhere to our previous rulings, and to the doctrines of the common
law as expounded by the courts of that country from which we
have derived our laws, our language and our system of jurisprudence. It is true that in many cases the principles of the common
law as sanctioned and enforced by the English courts are ill-suited
to the temper of our people and the genius of our institutions, but
as a general rule that state which most rigidly adheres to the course
of English decisions and precedents, will in the end attain the
most stable and the most conservative administration of justice.
For these reasons I am of opinion the judgment of the Circuit
Court should be reversed, the verdict set aside and a new trial
had in accordance with the principles herein announced.
MONCURE, P., and ANDERSON, J., concurred.
CHRISTIAN and BOULDIN, JJ., stated that they, very reluctantly, yielded their assent, in order that this question might be a
settled one in Virginia, but they both declared that if they could
control the decision upon this point, they would unhesitatingly
follow Lord MANSFIELD in Tezira v. _Evans, and they both stated
that in their opinion, Preston was both legally and morally bound
to pay this money.
The common-law rule that an agent to
fill in an essential part of an executed
deed must be constituted under seal, is
now in full force in England. The attempt made by Lord MANSFIELD 'in
Texira v. Evans to relax its strictness in
favor of a bondfide obligee was finally
unsuccessful. After serving as a precedent for sixty years, it was overruled by
Baron PARKE in Hibblewhite v. MciMforine, 6 Mf. & W. 216, and is no part
of modern English law. In Ea g leton v.
Gutteridge, 11 M. & W. 466, a blank in
the Christian name of an attorney in a
power was filled up by him after exenution by the principal ; but the addition, being held immaterial, did not
vitiate the power. Davidson v. Cooper,
11 Al. & W. 793, which was decided at
the same term, declares Texira v. Evans
overruled. In Squire v. Whitton, 1
House of Lords Cases 333, a bond exe-

cuted with the obligee's name in blank,
and filled in by implied authority, was
held Told both at law and in equity ; and
finally, in a case of great hardship,
Swan v. The North British Australasian
Co., 8 Jurist N. S. 940 (1862), an instrument under seal executed by the
plaintiff with blanks afterwards filled in
by a parol agent, in fraud of third par
ties, was held void by all the judges,
though the plaintiff had been guilty of
such culpable negligence that Baron
PAMKM was inclined to hold him estopped from denying that the instrument
was his. The English law may therefore be considered as settled.
The American decisions are hopelessly
conflicting. A majority of the states incline to the common-law rule, but a
large minority reject it ; some altogether,
some to a qualified extent, as the cases
before them demanded. Hesitating ne-
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tween the mischiefs that might ensue
from too bold an innovation upon the
common law,and the evident injustice of
allowing obligors to escape from the
consequences of their acts, the courts,
in those states which reject the strict doctrine, have departed from it only so far
as was necessary in the premises. Distinctions have been taken between a bond
and a conveyance; between a piece of
blank paper signed and sealed, and a
bond or deed in which some essential
part was wanting: between express authority and implied authority; between
authority to fill in a given name or a
fixed sum, and authority to insert the
name of whomsoever, for an amount to
be determined by the agent. Nor have
the decisions in individual states been
consistent. The fluctuations of judicial
opinion, as evinced in the number of
cases doubted and overruled, are very
noticeable. In this chaos of conflicting
authorities, it has been thought best to
present the law of the different states
seriatim, stating, as far as is necessary,
the circumstances of each case, and the
distinctions laid down by the court.
Arkansas, Illinois, Georgia, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, North Carolina and Tennessee, to which, we may
now add Virginia-follow the strict rule.
In some cases there has been an inclination to relax it, but the latest decisions
affirm it in its full vigor.
In Arkansas, the leading case is Cross
v. The State Bank, 5 Pike 525. In that
ease a bond was executed with a blank
for the sum, and filled in without express authority. The court say broadly
that the writing was no deed, and could
not be made such except by an agent
under seal. The American cases are reviewed, and the decision is in favor of
the common-law rule.
In Illinois, in Maus v. Worthing, 3
Seammon 26, written authority was given
to sign a surety's name to an appeal
bond; but, say the court, "the rule of
law seems well settled that an agent or

attorney cannot bind his principal by
deed, unless he has authority by deed so
to do." BREESE, J., dissenting, said,
"The rule as laid down appears to me
destitute of any good reason, and altogether too technical for this age." In
Bragg v. Fessenden, 11 111. 544, an
agent, according to a request in writing,
executed an appeal bond for his princi-pal, and a regular power of attorney
ratifying his action was afterwards filed
under seal. Held, that the original bond
was void, and qutere whether the ratification would relate back. See also People v. Organ, 27 Ill.
27.
In Georgia, in Ingram v. Little, 11
Geo. 174, a deed executed with blanks
was filled in by an agent appointed in
writing, and was held void. "We put
our decision," says NISBET, J. "1upon
authority, conceding that the books in
England and in this country are in distressing conflict, and with some misgiving whether reason and common sense
do not condemn it."
In Kentucky, the point was directly
decided in Cumnins v. Cassily, 5 B.
Monroe 75. "Can an agent without
authority under seal bind his principal
by a sealed instrument? The unbroken
current of decisions is to the contrary."l
See also, Southard v. Steele, 3 Monroe
435; 11cMurtry v. Frank, 4 Monroe 41;
Triinble v. Coons, I B. Monroe 199.
In 'Massachusetts, in Smith v. Crooker,
5 Mass. 538, followed in Hunt v. Adams,
6 Mass. 519, the name of a surety, after
lie had executed a bond, was filled into
the body of the bond by a parol agent
The decision turned entirely upon the
immateriality of the addition. In Burns
v. Lynde, 6 Allen 305 (1863), it was decided thht "filling up a blank form of a
deed by parol authority of one who has
signed and sealed it, will not make it a
valid conveyance, nles the in-strument
is redelivered." The Massaelbsetts cases
are reviewed, and shown to be conmistent
with the common law.
In Alississippi, a bond sealed with
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bianks which were afterwards filled in
by a parol agent, is void: Williams v.
Crutcher, 5 Howard 71. In Dickson v.
Hamer, Freeman's Ch. 284, the Chancellor declared himself constrained by
the authority of Williams v. Crutcher;
but intimated that in his view, the distinction lay between express and implied
authority.
In North Carolina, Yanhook v.Barnet,
4 Dev. Law 272, was decided upon the
immateriality of the addition. The
law was settled by Graham v. Holt, 3
Iredell's Law 300, in which a sum left
blank in a bond was afterwards filled in
by an agent not under seal. The bond
was held void, and Texira v. Evans
disapproved of. To the same effect are
McKee v. Hicks, 2 Dev. 379; Davenport v. Sleight, 2 Dev. & Bat. 381.
In Tennessee, a blank paper signed
and sealed, with verbal authority to fill
in as a bond, was held void after the
blanks had been filled. The judges
assert the common-law rule. See also
Smith v. Dickinson, 6 Humph. 261 ;
Turbeville v. Ryan, 1 Humph. 113, and
Mosby v. State of Arkansas, 4 Sneed
324.
The Virginia decisions are sufficiently
considered in the principal case. The
strict rule laid down by the majority of
the cj.urt will no doubt settle the law.
Next in order come the states that incline towards the English doctrine, without positively laying it down.
In California, a deed in due form,
signed, sealed and acknowledged by the
grantor, with the grantee's name afterwards inserted by a parol agent, is void:
Upton v. Archer, 41 Cal. 85 (1871). The
decision was under the Statute of Frauds,
which requires an agent for such a purpose to be appointed in writing; but the
counsel relied upon the common-law
doctrine, and the reasoning of the court
goes far to establish it.
In Ohio, a blank paper was signed
and sealed, and a money bond written
over 't by an agent verbally appointed:

Ayres v. Harness, I Ohio 368.
The
counsel cited cases like the principal
one; the court said, "an authority to
fill one particular blank falls far short
of an authority to make an entire deed."
In Maryland, in a case identical with
Ayres v. Harness, the court held the
bond void, but decided that a subsequent
acknowledgment by the grantor of his
hand and seal was a redelivery: .Byers
v. McClanahan, 6 G. & J. 250.
In Delaware, the distinction is taken
between implied and expressed authority,
and it was held in Clendaniel v. Hastings, 5 Harr. 408, that an authority
merely implied to fill in the blanks in
an executed bond, did not bind the
obligor.
In Pennsylvania, the earlier decisions
support Texira v. Evans. See Sigfried
v. Levan, 6 S. & R. 308; Stahl v. Berger, 10 S. & R. 170. In Wiley v. Moor,
17 S. & R. 438, the obligors signed and
sealed a piece of blank paper, and left
it with the judge to be filled in as a bond.
It was held binding, and Texira v.
Evans declared to be law. See also
Graham v. Ogle, 2 Penna. 132. But in a
later case, Wallace v. Harmstad, 3 Harris 468, and 2 Barr 194, it was held, in
effect, that no authority to fill in a deed
could be implied. 9cThere is no instance," says GiBsoN, C.J., " of an implied agency to alter a deed." 2exira
v. Evans "can be supported, if at all,
only upon the ground of an estoppel by
an act in pais." It seems probable that
express authority, especiallyif in writing,
would be held sufficient in Pennsylvania.
In New York, the decisions are con
flicting. In Ex parte Kirwen, 8 Cov
118, a blank for the sum left in an ap
peal bond was filled in after execution
by an agent verbally appointed, and held
valid. But in Hanford v. Mcair, 9
Wend. 54, a very strong case, the agent
was authorized in writing to enter into a
contract for the purchase of land., made
the contract under seal, and though rati-
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fled by the principal, it was held void.
The only exception to the strict rule
"is when the agent affixes the seal of
the principal in his presence and by his
direction." See also Blood v. Goodrich,
9 Wend. 68, 12 Wend. 525. In Bank
of Buffalo v. Kortright, 22 Wend. 348,
the Court of Errors declared Texira v.
Evans law in New York; but this statement was unnecessary to decide the case
in point, that of a blank transfer of a
stock certificate, not required to be under
seal. Accordingly, in Worrell v.Muan,
I Sold. 239, it was held that ifthe instrument executed by the agent derives
its validity merely from the seal, it is
void; but if good without seal, it will
be binding as a parol contract. The last
case is Chaunvy v.Arnold, 24 N. Y. 330
(1864), where the blanks never having
been filled
in,the deed was held void;
but see the opinion of the court. The
point must be considered still in doubt in
New York.
The Federal courts now lean towards
Texirav. Evans. Speakev. United States,
9 Crunch 28, settled that an express
parol authority to alter a sealed instrument could he shown ; but C. J. MARSHALL, in United States v. Nelson, 2

Brock. 64, decides, "with much doubt,"
that no implied authority will be sufficient. In Drury v. Foster, 2 Wall. 24
(1864), although the decilion turned
upon a personal incapacity, the court
intimated that, otherwise, a deed filled
in by a parol agent would be valid.
" Although it was at one time doubted
whether parol authority was adequate to
authorize an alteration or addition to a
sealed instrument, the better opinion at
this day is that the power is sufficient."
In Iowa, there is a strong dictun by
ID1ts.ox, J., in Sinn,;v. Hervey, 19 Iowa
273, against Texira v. E'rans. But in
Der, v. Miner, 29 Iowa 298, an express authority to in-crt a grantee's name,
iollowed by ratification, was held binding; an in Owen v. Perry, 25 Iowa
412 (1868), it was decided that a writ-

ten authority would be sufficient, though
the deed was to be filled up to whomsoever.
In Connecticut, the point does not seem
to be directly ruled, but the inclination
of the court is towards Tcxira v. Evans.
In Bridgeport Bank v. N. Y 6" N. H.
-R. R., 30 Conn. 231, a blank power of
attorney under seal accompanying stock
certificates, was filled up. The court
decided it valid under New York law;
but ELLSWOttTH, J., intimated that the
Connecticut law would be the saute.
In New Jersey, Caniden Bank v. Hall,
2 Greer 383, does not seem decisive, as
the circumstances of the case might well
have amounted to a redelivery.
In Mfaine, parol authority to fill in
any instrument under seal is sufficient.
See the cases reviewed by the court in
Inhabitantsof South Berwick v. Hurtress,
53 Maine, 89.
In Alabama, Boardnian v. Gore, 1
Stew. 517, is a case of implied authority
to fill in the obligee's name; but as the
bond was payable to -1 - or Bearer,"
the insertion was hardly material. In
Gibbs v. Frost, 4 Ala. N. S. 720, an
express parol authority was held sufficient. Texira v. Evans is quoted as
authority.
In Texas and Indiana, the statutes
aboli-hng seal, and in Louisiana the
peculiar system of the state, would
probably be fatal to the common-law
rule. In the latter state, appeal bonds
filled in after execution by the sureties
have always been held binding: Breedlote v. Johnson, 2 Martin N. S. 517 ;
The State v. The Judges, 19 La. 179,
even in a case of extreme hard.qhip
Charlaronv. MAfcFarlane, 9 La. 230.
Finally, in South Carolina, the courts
explicitly sustain Texira v. Erans. All
the cases appear to be those of express
authority ; but the reaoaing of the
judges goes the full lenglh : RBank of S.
0. v. I.ananond, 1 Rich. 281: Gourdin
v. Cominunder, 6 Rich. 497 ; in,an v.
Hodges, 4 MeC. 239. But it was inti-
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mated in the last case that a blank piece
of paper signed and sealed is utterly
nugatory.
It is proper to add that all the cases
agree that if the instrument under seal
be filled up in the presence of the grantor
and with his consent, it will be binding
upon him. The agent is then considered
merely his hand in filling in the blanks.
If in the conflict of authorities, the
expression of an individual opinion be
permitted,-the common law rule seems
to us too technical to be suited to our

modern society. The only substantial
reasons in its favor are founded upon
the danger of perjury and the uncertainty of parol testimony. These disadvantages would not exist in the case
of implied authority, and could be
readily obviated by requiring express
authority to be in writing. When so
many incidents to the seal have been
abolished, no valid reason is perceived
for retaining one so apt to screen fraud
and injustice.
R. S. H.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.
ATWOOD, TRUSTEE, v. HOLCOMB.
A father, acting in good faith, may make a valid gift to his minor son of his
time and future earnings, although insolvent at the time.

brought to the Court of Common Pleas of Hartford
county, and tried on the general issue, with notice, closed to the
court. Judgment for the plaintiff and motion for a new trial by
the defendants.
On March 23d 1867, the plaintiff was indebted to the defendant Holcomb and was insolvent. He had a son Arthur, seventeen
years of ag6, and on that day gave him a letter of emancipation,
by which he agreed that his services and future earnings, which
then belonged to the plaintiff, should belong thereafter to the son.
There was no consideration whatever for this gift. In September
of that year Arthur negotiated for the purchase of a colt with 6ne
Hays, who completed the sale with the plaintiff's wife, and conveyed the title to her in the same month. She paid therefor $5
of her own, and Arthur thereafter caused $22.50 of his wages,
earned after the date of the letter of emancipation, to be paid as
part payment for the colt. This colt was afterwards exchanged for
a horse. The defendants caused this horse to be attached in a suit
against the plaintiff, and the plaintiff brought trover as trustee for
his wife.
TROVER;

Perkins (with whom was IF. C. Case), in support of the motion.-It is well settled that the policy of our law favors an appropriation of all available means of the debtor, of every kind, for
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the payment of his debts: Ensworth v. Davenport, 9 Conn. 393 ;
Bemington v. Cady, 10 Id. 47 ; -Davenportv. Lacon, 17 Id. 281 ;
Bray v. lVallingford, 20 Id. 419. If the son had already worked,
and wages were due to the father, there can be no question that a
gift of them would be void as against existing creditors. Why
should any distinction be made between a gift of wages due, and
those to become due ? The father has a right to the wages of his
minor child. They are just as much his as his own wages, or those of
his wife, as much as the avails of the labor of his hired man, his oxen
or his horses. Reeve in his treatise on Domestic Relations says (p.
423), "The father can no more give to the child the avails of his
service to the prejudice of his creditors, than he can any other
property." Chase v. -Elkins, 2 Vt. 290; Bray v. Wheeler, 29
Id. 414; Jenney v. Alden, 12 Mass. 375; Winchester v. Bied,
8 Jones (Law) 377.
Goodm.an, contrA, cited Welton v. l!orse, 6 Conn. 547 ; Torrington v. Norwich, 21 Id. 543, 547 ; Reeve's Dom. Rel. 422, note;
Jenison v. Graves, 2 Blackf. 440; Cha.'e v. Elkins, 2 Vt. 290;
Chase v. Smith, 5 Id. 566 ; Bush v. Vought, 55 Penna. St. R.
437; lifc~loskey v. Cyphert, 27 Id. 220; Holdship v. Pa 'erson,
7 Watts 547; Bray v. Wheeler, 29 Vt. 514; N2qhtingale v.
Withingtvn, 15 Mass. 272, 275; Corey v. Corey, 19 Pick. 29.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
,SEYmouRt, J.-Upon the facts the defendants' counsel make
the question-Was the gift of the father to the son, of the avails
of his labor thereafter, a valid one as against those who were creditors of the father at the time? On examining the record it does
not distinctly appear that the debt of the defendant Holcomb was
prior in time to the letter of emancipation, but from what was said
by counsel in the discussion we suppose in truth it was prior, and
shall decide the case upon that as being the fact.

In regard to

the insolvency of Mr. Atwood, the father, the finding is that at
the time of the attachment lie was, and for many years previous
had been, shiftless and unable to pay his debts.
If the obligation of a minor child to labor for his father is in
the iatnre of an ordinary debt and properly a thing in action like
a bond or promissory note, the argument of the defendlant would
have full force, that the father must be just before lie is generous.
and could no more forgive to his son the obligation of personal her-
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vice, to the prejudice of creditors. than he could give away a valuable bond. But there axe differences between an ordinary debt and a
child's obligation to serve his father. If Mr. Atwood had died
insolvent on the day of the date of the letter of emancipation, the
law itself would have done for the son what the father attempted
to do. The law would have given the son his time, and his earnings would thereafter have been his own. Neither the defendant
nor any other creditor of the father would have any claim on the
son that he should labor for the benefit of his father's estate. This
duty of service is not assets like a bond in the hands of an administrator for payment of debts, nor for any purpose. So too in
case of bankruptcy it is clear that the father's right to his children's services does not pass as assets for the benefit of creditors
to the assignee in bankruptcy. The son, therefore, is not in law
regarded as an ordinary debtor to his father, nor is the father's
right to the son's services regarded in law as mere property either
in possession or in action. The right and the duty are in the main
personal, and are founded on the intimate relation that during minority must .necessarily exist between the parties. The age of
twenty-one years is fixed by law as the utmost period of the relation, but it may be terminated before that period by the mutual
agreement of the parties, so as to put an end to the duty of personal service. This was decided in Welton v. Morse, 6 Conn.
547. The law wisely permits the father to consult the genius, capacity and inclination of his son, and if he thinks it best that his
child should be stimulated to industry by receiving the fruit of his
own labor or best that he should before twenty-one be put upon
his own resources to earn a living, he may by law anticipate the
usual period of majority and release to him all claim upon his
earnings.
The father by statute, with the minor's consent, may bind his
son as an apprentice to learn a useful trade, thus transferring to
the master the right of service. And in such case the practice is
to give to the minor child the whole benefit of his labor, either
in instruction or in board and clothing, and if a sum of money is
to be paid at the end of the apprenticeship by the master it is
usual and we suppose universal to stipulate for its payment to the
son himself and not to the father: Chamberlin's Commercial Law
377, 846. Now by such indentures of apprenticeship the father
relinquishes to the son the benefit of the son's service, and the
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father's creditors may be affected by it as much .as the creditors of
Mr. Atwood are affected by the emancipation in the case before
us. But we think the law does not permit creditors to control the
father's freedom in the important matter of dealing with his son's
time and employment as the best interest of his son may seem to
require. By the law of nature every person is entitled to the fruit
of his own labor and skill. Municipal law, which gives to the
father the earnings of his children during their minority, does not
intend to contravene this law of nature, but merely to modify it,
giving to the father the control of his children's earnings as the
means of providing for their maintenance and education, under
the idea that the father is more capable than the child to direct
his industry and supply his wants, and under the further idea that
the parent will use his power with paternal regard for the best interests of his child, and not as a mere means of profit to himself.
Hence, it is settled law that if the father abandons the child and
leaves him to provide for himself, the child becomes entitled to
his earnings as a means of support, and the father has no claim
upon them to reimburse himself for past expenses incurred in infancy: Nightingale v. Withington, 15 Mass. 272. So too by marrying during minority a daughter is freed from all legal obligation to labor for her father.
If therefore by mutual consent a child is emancipated before
arriving at the age of twenty-one, and is left to provide for himself under an agreement that his time shall be his own, we think
the father's creditors have no ground to complain of the arrangement. The father relinquishes nothing which was intended as a
source of profit to him, he merely remits his son to his natural
rights at an earlier period than that fixed by law. If however
such arrangement is merely colorable-a mere sham to protect the
son's wages from creditors, while as between the parties the father
still is to control and have the benefit of them, then the transaction is void as against creditors. So too after wages are actually
earned before emancipation, the gift of such wages or their proceeds
to the son would be subject to the ordinary rules which govern
voluntary conveyances of property. Probably Judge Reeve had
such a case in his mind when lie penned the sentence in his valuable treatise on domestic relations on which the defendaiits rely.
The case before us relates to wages earned by the son after he
had been emancipated, after he had reason to suppose that he
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was laboring for himself under an arrangement which appears
to have been proper under the circumstances and made in good
faith.
The father was shiftless and unable to pay his debts. Such instances are unfortunately too common, where the head of the family
fails to provide comfortably for the household and is discouraged
by the burden of debt from attempting much to improve his own
condition or that of his family. In this state of things a son
seventeen years of age proposes to start for himself and with his
own earnings to provide his own food, raiment and education. The
father consents, and the son by the labor of his own hands earns
a few dollars, and we are called on to decide between the son's title
and that of his father's creditors to these earnings. In a case
somewhat analogous, of the wife's earnings, which at common law
belong to the husband, our statutes have carefully protected the
proceeds of her labor from her husband's creditors and secured
them to her own use. These statutes proceed upon the same principle of natural law and justice which we feel bound to apply to a
child's wages, in cases like the present. Those statutes however
go much further in the protection of the wife's earnings than we
are called on to go in favor of a child's, for as already, stated the
son's wages earned before emancipation are regarded as his
father's property, and of course like other property are liable to
attachment.
We have carefully examined the authorities cited by the counsel
for the defendants, but we find no case which favors their claim,
and though perhaps no case has gone the full length claimed by
the plaintiff, yet the language of the judges in Massachusetts, Vermont and Pennsylvania is in conformity with the views which we
have expressed; and both on principle and authority we think the
decision of the .Court of Common Pleas was correct, and we therefore advise no new trial.
The questions arising, in the administration of the law, as to the relative
rights and duties of parents and children,
are always of great interest in states and
communities of high advancement in
Christian culture and civilization; and
many of them are attended with doubt
and difficulty. And it must be confessed,
that these questions are undergoing con-

siderable changes in this country at the
present time, and have been for many
years. The pecuniary advantages or disadvantages naturally to be expected to
arise in consequence of a considerably
numerous offspring, will vary much with
circumstances, but especially with the
modes of living and the demands of cxpenditure for education, dress and amuse-
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meats. The demand in these respects
has chaLged immensely, in this country,
in the last half century. In the early
years of the present century, in most
parts of the United States, a numerous
family of boys was regarded as a kind
of property, a sort of productive estate,
from which the father might surely count
upon deriving considerable revenue, towards the payment of debts or the improvement of his estate and condition in
life. At that period it was natural to
find overwary or overgreedy creditors
looking to such sources for the payment
of their dues. And wherethe father, as
sometimes occurred, relinquished his
claim upon the time and labor of his
sons, in order the more completely to
enable such sons to apply their earnings
toward the comfortable support and education of the other members of the family,
it no doubt had very much the appearance of an evasion of the just claims of
creditors for advancements, sometimes,
no doubt, made for the support or education of these same sons, at a period
before they were able to earn much
towards either their own, or the support
of the family. Hence, in many of the
states, from time to time, questions have
been brought before the courts, in regard
to the exact nature of the father's claim
upon the labor of his sons, and how far
it partook of the nature of property in
w'hich creditors could claim rights of any
kind. Thus in Vermont, we find the
early case of C7,asev. Ellins, 2 Vt. 290,
where the right of the father to sell the
on his time is indeed recognised; but
the learned judge, in giving the opinion
Df the court, seems to regard the father's
claim upon his son's labor till he comes
of age, as in the nature of "property,
he has the same right to dispose of, in
good faith, as he has of other property."
This riglt to sell the -on his time is
placed upon the grounl, that it is necessary in order " that lie may consult the
genius, capacity and inclination of his
son," in regard to his permanent occu-

pation in life, and thus enable hm -t
pursue either some occupation of labor
or some of the liberal arts according to
his capacity or inclination. And the
same doctrine is again affirmed by the
same court, in Chase v. Smith, 5 Vt.
556. But here the right of the father
is asserted in more unqualified terms ;
for instance, he may either sell or give
his son his time, "and after that the
son is entitled to his own earnings," not
only as against the father, but his creditors also. And the right of the father,
as against his creditors, to give his son
his time and future earnings is fully recognised in Tillotsoa v. McBrillis, 11
Vt. 477, Bray v. Wheeler, 29 Vt. 514,
which he could not do if it were property
belonging to the father. So it seems to
have been held at an early day in Massachusetts, that if the father abandons
the son and fails to provide for him,
during his minority, he cannot afterwards
claim the benefit of his earnings: Nightingale v. Withington, 15 Mlass. 272;
Corey v. Corey, 19 Pick. 29. So too it
was held in New Hampshire, in Hall v.
Hall, 44 N. H. 293, that the father may
release to the son all claim upon his earnings, and that thereafter the father may
employ him and pay him wages. And
where the father becomes a pauper tile
town will hare no claim upon the earnings of his children, unless by statutory
provision : Jrnncss v. Enirrson, 15 N. II.
486. The general doctrine that the
father may relinquish all claim to hik
son's time and labor, Aithout infringing
any right of his creditors, i., generally.
if not universally, recognised thriughot

the country. Schouler Don. Rel. .341 ;
C'anIroll v. Coopmr, 34 N. II. 49 ; Ulowl
V. Ilanilton, 11 llumph. 104; Armstrong
v. MIcDonald; 10 Barb. 300 ; Sn(di'er
v. Evcringqhmin. 3 l)utch. 14.3; 5tccl v.
Steel. 12 l'cnna. St. 64 ; and numerous
other cnses miclht le cited.
There is no doubt in regard to the
soundnes of tie deci.ion in the principal
case, and the grounds of the doctrine
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ire very fully brought out in the opinion. extent of education which was afforded
The wonder is, perhaps, that, at this
late day, any one should continue so
old-fash,)'ned in his views as to consider
the father's right to his children's services
in the light of property, which his cred*tors might treat as security for their
claims. In the wonderful advance in
the expense of living and the education
of children, the father with a numerous
family is regarded more in the nature
of an incumbered debtor, than of one
possessing large resources for future advancement. The demands for education
have increased, at the very least, ten fold,
within fifty years, and the expense of the
same degree of culture has advanced almost in the same ratio. At a time when
every town, or city high school, affords
the means of acquiring almost the same

by the colleges at that time, we should
scarcely expect children to find much
time to labor for the benefit of the
family.
The truth unquestionably is that any
such claim, at any time, must have
resulted from the narrowness of the
means of support and education afforded
by the country. How far we may now
be travelling toward an opposite extreme we need not stop to inquire. It
will be sufficient for the present purpose
to be able to see clearly that there exists
no reason for the claim, that parents
have any pecuniary interest in the earnings of their children, which they may
not gratuitously relinquish without infringing any rights of creditors, present
I. F. R.
or prospective.

Gty Court of Louisvle, Kentucky.
CITY OF LOUISVILLE v. JEFF. BROWN.
An Act of the Legislature authorizing the city of Louisville to compel every
Attorney practising therein to pay a license of ten dollars per annum, and subjecting them to a fine in case of refusal, is unconstitutional and void as to attorneys
admitted to pract;" before the passage of the Act.
An attorney -'"dcounsellor at law is vested with an official right which cannot
be tramm,4led r,. Pay way except for official and professional misconduct.

Trt case -*as submitted upon the following agreed facts: The
defendant was licensed in 1848, to practise as an attorney and
counsellor at law, in all the Courts of this commonwealth; and
under and by the authority of such license was then sworn into
office, and has been ever since, and is now, practising his said
profession. It was further agreed, that he had not taken out any
license from the Inspector of License in the city of Louisville.
The Legislature of Kentucky by an act, approved March 3d
1870, authorized the General Council, by ordinance, to require
licenses of each attorney and counsellor at law, with adequate penalties for doing business without the required license. And the
General Council, in pursuance thereto, passed an ordinance,
"That each and every lawyer practising in the city of Louisville
VOL. XXI.-47
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shall pay a license of ten dollars per annum. Every person who,
for fee or reward, shall prosecute or defend causes in any court of
record or other judicial tribunal of the United States, or any of
the states, or whose business it is to give legal advice in relation
to any cause or matter whatever, shall be deemed to be a lawyer.
"See. 2. Any person violating any of the provisions of this
ordinance, shall, for each offence, be fined not less than ten, nor
more than twenty dollars." Approved April 10th 1870.
For defendant's failure to take out such license from the Inspector's office, this warrant was issued to impose the fine on him.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GEo. W. JoiINSoN, J. pro tem.-This court is now called upon
to decide upon the constitutionality of the Act of the Legislature,
styled the New City Charter, as well as the legality of the ordinance of the General Council, requiring lawyers "practising in
the city of Louisville to take out additional license."
In doing this it will be necessary to review the duty and office
of lawyer. That he is an officer of the court, and as much so athe judge, city attorney or clerk, and required to take the same
kind of oath of office, it is only necessary to refer to the language
of the law on the subject, and the form of the oath of office, as
well to the attorney as to the other officers of the court. By the
law, as it existed before the new constitution, as well as the oath
prescribed therein to the officer, including the attorney at law, it
is called an " oath of office," and the attorney, like other officer,.
is installed into office by the judgment of the court. lie is required to procure license from the judges of the courts, who are
liable to punishment if it is wrongfully granted, and the law'yer is
liable to penalty if he should abuse his office. This lieense is his
commission to exercise the functions of his office, and to shield the
community against impostors who have not been adjudged to hav o
the requisite qualifications.
The right of the Legislature and General Council of this city,
t) impose. cx post.facto, additional license, is now to be determined.
Thc Constitution of the United States says: "No state shall pass
any bill of attainder, ex post facto law or law impairing the oblit fwto applies
gation of contracts." That the meaning a exo,,.fc
to any penalty, whether pecuniary or other di.-alility, it is only
necessary to refer to the case of Fleteher v. Peek, 6 Cranch 137,
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wherein Chief Justice MARSHALL defines it to be "1one which
renders an act punishable in a manner in which it was not punishable when it was committed."
The same court says, in the case
of Cummings v. The State of Missouri, 4 Wall. 329, in defining
what is punishment, "The deprivation of any rights, civil or
political, previously enjoyed, may be punishment, the circumstances
attending, and the causes of the deprivation determining this fact.
Disqualification from the pursuit of a lawful profession or avocation or from the positions of trust or from the privilege of appearing in courts or acting as executor, administrator or guardian, may
also and often has been imposed as punishment.
"The theory upon which our political institutions rest is, that
all men have certain inalienable rights; that among these are life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness; and that in the pursuit of
happiness, all avocations, all honors, all positions are alike open
to every one, and that in the protection of these rights, all are
equal before the law."
It is very evident the right to fill the office of lawyer, after one
has been installed into office, complying with all the requirements
of the constitution and laws made in pursuance, can not be questioned nor trammelled, either directly or collaterally, by additional
licenses. The same court in the case of -Ex parte Garland,4
Wallace 378, says: "The profession of an attorney and counsellor at law is not like an office created by Act of Congress, which
depends for its continuance, its powers and its emoluments upon
the will of its creator, and the possession of which may be burdened with any conditions, not prohibited by the constitution.
They are officers of the court, admitted as such by its order, upon
the evidence of their possessing legal learning and fair private
character. The order of admission is the judgment of the court,
that the parties possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys and
counsellors, and are entitled to appear as such, and conduct causes
therein. From its entry the parties become officers of the court,
and are responsible to it for professional misconduct. They hold
their office during good behavior, and can only be deprived of it
for misconduct, ascertained and declared by the judgment of the
court, after opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Their ad.
mission or exclusion is not the exercise of a mere ministerial
power. It is the exercise of a judicial power. The attorney and
counsellor at law being by the solemn judicial act of the court,
clothed with his office, does not hold it as a matter of grace or
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favor.

The right which it confers upon him to appear for suitors

and to argue causes is something more than a mere indulgence,
revocable at the pleasure of a court or at the command of the
Legislature. It is a right of which he can only be deprived by the
judgment of the court for moral and professional delinquency."
It is not deemed necessary to cite other authorities to sustain
the idea, that an attorney and counsellor at law is vested with an
official right, which cannot be trammelled in any way except for
official and professional misconduct.
It only remains to be seen whether the requirements of the Legislature, as expressed in said act and in said ordinance of the
General Council, do so limit and burden his said office as to conflict with his vested right to use his said office under the constitution.
It will be noticed that this proceeding is to fine, and imprison in
case the fine is not paid. It is a criminal proceeding, whose execution is imprisonment. It deprives defendant of his liberty, both
of profession and person. The execution of the judgment against
him for doing that which the constitution, the laws at the time he
took his oath of office, the order and judgment of the court authorized him to do, by imprisonment, would certainly be a punishment, which the spirit of our laws does not authorize. No
case could be conceived more clearly ex )ostfacto than this, and
more directly in cdnflict with the Constitution of the United
States.
It cannot avail the plaintiff to say that this additional license is
only a tax, when it is called by the Legislature, by the General
Council and by the paper itself a license. A license is a leave,
liceo, to give leave. Tax is from taxo, to burden. Two words of
very different meaning. If the object of the Legislature had been
to burden the lawyer with taxes for exercising the functions of his
office, or to imprison him if he was unable to pay it, they certainly could have found language to express their meaning. ]ut
admitting that the object of this license from the inspector's office
was to obtain revenue by taxes, and that taxes is what they mei,
still this burden or punishment cannot escape the constitutional
condemnation. The defendant was licensed, too1 the required
oath and was installed into office by the judgment of' the court in
1848, during good behavior. Any punishnent-and the judgment of this court in favor of plaintiff certainly would b a run-
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ishmet-cannot escape the constitution as ex post facto. If the
office of lawyer is to be classed with trades, mechanics and merchants, who are not officers of the law, nor members of the judiciary nor courts, as has been intimated by the judges, still it would
be ez post facto. A license is granted to any one of the trades,
generally for one year, upon the payment of a certain sum. Certainly the law-making power could fiot increase the sum, nor
require them to procure other licenses till the end of the year, or
the expiration of their licenses; and any punishment imposed
upon them for failing to procure other licenses before the expiration of those already granted them would be ex post facto and
unconstitutional. Let the same rule be applied to defendant, and
he cannot be punished for exercising the functions of his office
during existence of his license, which is during good behavior, in
other words, for life. But this court cannot see the propriety of
classing the members and officers of the judiciary, licensed and
sworn members of the courts of justice, with mechanics, merchants
and tradesmen, who have no official capacity, take no oath of
office, nor any order or judgment of a court recognising their
position. There is no analogy between them, and the notion has
no foundation in reason nor justice; and if such a mode of reasoning has to be resorted to before lawyers can be punished, it will be
best to let lawyers go unpunished, that the judiciary may remain
untrammelled, and the courts permitted to administer to suitors
justice, "without sale, denial or delay."
The legality of the ordinance under the city charter is very
questionable, if there was no doubt as to the propriety of the
charter itself. The ordinance requires every lawyer, whether he
may reside in Frankfort, Lexington, or anywhere else, to procure
such license, or pay a fine, or go to prison in case he fails to pay
the fine, before he can attend to any causes in the state or United
States court, held at Louisville, in bankruptcy, or anything else,
or give legal advice in relation to any cause whatever pending in
Louisville. This embraces about every lawyer in the state. The
city charter certainly authorizes no such ordinance. The city
charter authorized "the General Council to require license of each
attorney and counsellor at law." It certainly meant those residing
and doing business in the city of Louisville. The ordinance applies to every lawyer practising in the city of Louisville in any
court of record or other judicial tribunal of the United States or

